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We test competing theories of capital structure choices using firm-level data on firm 
borrowings.  The majority of firms in the dataset are privately owned, young, micro, or 
small and medium sized enterprises (SME) firms concentrated in the service sector.  In 
general, the financing pattern of firms is low leverage ratios and, in particular, low levels of 
intermediated financing and long-term financing.  Average firm growth rates decreased 
dring the five years of the sample period.  Average profitability growth ratios are also 
negative across age and sectors and large firms have the highest negative profit growth rate.  
Statistical tests find a positive firm size effect on financial intermediation.  Larger firms 
have higher leverage ratios (both short term and long term), including higher use of trade 
credit.  There is also a negative influence of profitability on leverage ratios (more profitable 
firms use less external financing), which supports the “pecking order” theory that in 
environments with greater asymmetric information (such as weaker credit information) 
firms prefer to use internal or inter-firm financing.  Finally, firms operating in a competitive 
environment have higher leverage ratios.  For instance, young, small firms are the most 
active employment generators in the Polish economy.  We find overall that SMEs seem to 
be very active in creating jobs in recent years.  This suggests that a new type of firm is 
emerging that is more market and profit-oriented.  But at the same time, these firms appear 
to have financial constraints that impede their growth.  Improvements in the business 
environment, such as better credit and registry information, could help promote growth in 
this sector. 
   3
Section 1: Introduction 
Prior to its transition period, the Polish economy was dominated by large state 
owned enterprises (SOEs), which employed the largest fraction of the labor force, 
undertook the largest share of investment activities, and received the largest share of bank 
financing.  However, the liberalization process has provided a major role for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) as a driving force in the transformation of the Polish private 
sector. 
Considering the importance of SMEs in promoting growth and dynamism in 
transition economies, it is critical to analyze the willingness of the banking sector to lend 
money to SMEs and the degree to which financial intermediaries have facilitated their 
development.
1  Previously, the practice of funding economic activity in transition 
economies had been mostly directed by the central authorities.  It is only after the 
liberalization process that the banking sector has been able to choose its borrowers and 
channel a larger share of its funding to companies of different types.
2  In order to make 
market based loans, commercial banks were required to measure default risk, which 
includes firm-level measures of profitability, growth opportunities, and available collateral, 
as well as country-level risk, such as the efficacy of bankruptcy laws and enforcement.  In 
this paper, we analyze the financial structure of a large sample of Polish firms, hoping to 
shed light on the firm characteristics that are associated with greater access to financing.  
These findings can be useful in developing policy recommendations to expand lending to 
small and new firms.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews previous literature on SME 
financing and the specific challenges of SMEs in Eastern Europe.  Section 3 provides 
summary statistics of firm characteristics by size, age, region, sector and ownership 
structure.  Section 4 uses regression analysis to test theories of capital structure for a sample 
of Polish firms.  Section 5 concludes. 
Section 2: Literature Review 
What is specific about SMEs? 
Many previous studies have analyzed the unique role of SMEs in developed 
countries.  Studies of firms in the United States highlight the importance of SMEs not only 
as a protagonist for creating new employment opportunities, but also as a source of 
innovation.  Beginning in the 1970s, large manufacturing firms in key industries began to 
lose their competitiveness, and a number of important empirical studies emerged 
documenting the role of SMEs in addressing this problem.  For example, Acs (1984) 
discusses how newer and smaller firms entered sectors as “agents of change”.  Studies 
using direct measures of innovative activity – based on new products and processes rather 
                                                 
1 For additional analysis of the role of SMEs in transition economies see “SME Financing in Eastern Europe” 
by Klapper, Sarria-Allende, and Sulla (2003). 
2 See “Commercial Bank Lending to SMEs in Poland” by Melanie Feakins (2004).   4
than R&D – have shown that innovative activity is primarily introduced by small firms and 
not by the larger incumbents (see Acs and Audrestsch, 1988 and 1990). Similarly, Acs and 
Audretsch (1991) find that smaller firms contribute to greater innovation per number of 
employees relative to larger firms within the United States.  Such findings have also 
prompted innovation policy studies in transition economies and promotion of the SME 
sector in general (see Havas, 2002, for Hungary, Lloyd-Reason et. al. 2002 for Czech 
Republic). 
Recent cross-country studies find a strong association between the importance of 
SMEs and GDP per capita growth, but do not find that SMEs exert a causal impact on 
growth.  Furthermore, the authors find no evidence that SMEs reduce poverty (Beck, 
Demriguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003).  This finding suggests that the impact of the SME 
sector might vary by country and region.  
More recently, there has been growth in literature specifically focusing on SMEs in 
Eastern Europe.  The key difference is that these papers focus on the unique transition 
process that Eastern European countries have experienced.  Unlike SMEs in the United 
States, many SMEs in Eastern Europe have been created either as a result of the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises or as new entrants that have emerged after the 
market liberalization process.  Consequently, most studies have focused on the 
restructuring process that has taken place in transition economies (see Svejnar 2002).  For 
instance, Bilsen and Konings (1998) highlight the job-creation and performance differences 
among state-owned and de novo private firms.  They find that new private firms in selected 
transition economies were the most dynamic in terms of job creation, and that they widely 
out-performed state-owned enterprises.   
The Financing of SMEs 
The role of finance as a significant contributor to development of SMEs has been an 
important area of study.  Previous literature has examined financing across SMEs and 
shown that they have different capital structures from larger firms.  For example, Cressy 
and Olofsson (1997) find that smaller businesses have lower fixed to total asset ratios, 
higher current liabilities relative to total assets, and grater financial risk.  Studies also 
identify the information asymmetries associated with SME lending to explain why it is 
harder for SMEs to access debt financing.  Along these lines, Berger and Udell (1995) find 
smaller and younger firms are more likely to face higher cost (interest rate) of financing 
and be required to pledge collateral. Similarly, Satio and Villanueva (1981) and Peel and 
Wilson (1996) find in general SMEs to have higher costs and reduced access to financing 
because of the information asymmetries associated with newer, smaller firms.  
On the other hand, Scherr, et al. (1990) and Hamilton and Fox (1998) find that 
smaller companies prefer to limit their issuance of outside equity in order to maintain 
control.  Therefore, most SMEs are structured around concentrated equity stakes, the 
corporate governance implications of which have been studied extensively.  For example, 
Brush and Chaganti (1998) find ownership structure and creditors rights protection have a 
significant positive influence on the size and performance of SMEs.  Consequently, 
country-specific factors such as creditor rights and legal efficiency seem to explain the   5
unique challenges faced by SMEs accessing external finance: small firms in countries with 
strong creditor protection are more likely to receive external financing compared to 
comparable firms that are located in weak legal environments. 
SMEs in Eastern Europe 
Looking more closely at SMEs in Eastern European countries, we find a growing 
body of literature studying financial characteristics and capital structure determinants, 
either within a cross-sectional setting or in the form of a country-specific analysis.  
Among the first group, we find studies that broadly examine financial market 
development across Eastern Europe.  For instance, Gros and Suhrchke (2000) analyze 
several transition economies and identify the chief similarities and differences across them 
in terms of the level of financial development, concentration of ownership, and legal and 
governance standards.  A study by the World Bank (2002) examines the early stages of 
reform and transition to market economy performed by the corporate sector.  In particular, 
it highlights the dynamism of the SME sector in Poland and Hungary, where structural 
reforms have created a favorable climate for entry of new businesses.  
Other studies focus on property rights as a determinant of access to financing for 
small firms in Eastern Europe. Shleifer (1997) and Frye and Shleifer (1997) show, for 
instance, that property rights are particularly weak and a severe disincentive to growth in 
Russia, while this is not the case for Poland, which has relatively more secure property 
rights than other countries in the region.
3  Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) study 
manufacturing firms in Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Russia based on a survey 
carried out in 1997.  They find a wide degree of variation across these countries in their 
access to bank finance as well as in their perceived security of property rights.  The authors 
find the highest percentage of borrowers to be in Poland, with bank financing about 2.3% 
of annual sales (the highest along with Russia within their sample of countries).  They also 
find a high rate of reinvestment of profits in Poland, which they explain is a virtue of strong 
property rights in the country, relative to neighboring economies.   
  Additional studies, which more directly analyze the determinants of capital 
structure, find a significant degree of financing constraints faced by SMEs.
4  The supply of 
finance seems to be particularly determined by firms’ reputation, growth and profitability.  
Closely related to our study is a paper by Klapper, Sarria-Allende, and Sulla (2002) who 
use the Amadeus database to analyze patterns of corporate sector development across 15 
Eastern and Central European countries during the transition from planned to market 
economies.  This report finds that SMEs seem to constitute the most dynamic sector of the 
Eastern European economies, relative to large firms.  In general, the SME sector comprises 
                                                 
3 It is argued that within country variation in property rights can also exist, influencing access to bank credit 
(Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002) 
4 Konings, Rizov and Vandenbussche (2003) find that investment by firms in Poland and Czech Republic is 
more sensitive to internal financing constraints, as compared to the Romania and Bulgaria case, due to 
presence of soft budget constraints in the latter. In the same vain, Cornelli et. al. (1996) and Weller (1999) 
observe that Polish industries have operated under hard budget constraints and were finance constrained 
during the early stages of the transition process.   6
relatively younger, more highly leveraged, and more profitable and faster growing firms.  
This suggests that a new type of firm might be emerging in transition economies that is 
more market- and profit-oriented.  But at the same time, these firms appear to have 
financial constraints that impede their access to long-term financing and ability to grow. 
In addition, there have been a number of World Bank surveys of SMEs in Eastern 
Europe; e.g. Chaves, Sanchez, Schor and Tesliuc (2001) in Romania and  Broadman and 
Recanatini (2001) in Russia.  Other World Bank studies have examined the determinants of 
capital structure of Bulgarian firms (Budina, Garretsen and De Jong (2000)), Hungarian and 
Polish enterprises (Cornelli et. al. (1996)), and Romanian (Carare and Perotti (1997)) and 
Hungarian companies (Colombo (2001)).   
Section 3: Data Description 
Firm Distribution 
We use the Bureau Van Dijk “Amadeus” dataset to extract firm-level information 
on private and publicly owned non-financial Polish firms.  The Amadeus database is a 
comprehensive source of firm-level financial and ownership information, mostly collected 
from the National Court Register.  The data include only limited liability companies and 
PLC registrations that are required to submit annual filings, and excludes sole-proprietors 
and partnerships.
5  The database contains detailed financial and accounting information for 
each firm, including balance sheet and profit and loss statements, along with other firm-
specific data such as year of incorporation, official address, legal form, auditors, number of 
employees and industry codes.  There is also ownership information for the most recent 
year of data that includes details on the largest shareholders (all shareholders with more 
than 5% equity stake), such as reporting name, equity stake and country of origin, as well 
as details on subsidiaries.  It is important to note that the coverage of data in Amadeus is 
dependent on the successful collection of information by the Polish National Court 
Register.  In addition, the data exclude firms in the informal sector. 
Until 1996, Amadeus included predominantly large and listed companies.  Since 
1998, the coverage of small and medium enterprises has increased substantially.  We 
therefore exclude all years prior to 1998, so as to obtain a balanced number of firms in 
various size categories within the sample.  In addition, we excluded 2003, since data 
coverage is very sparse. We also drop all firms that have missing assets and sales 
information, which is critical for creating financing ratios and identifying size categories.  
Since the study covers the years 1998-2002, the number of observations varies significantly 
during the period, going from 5,757 observations in the year 1998 to 15,315 in the year 
2002.  
                                                 
5 Sole-proprietors and partnerships are required to register with local municipal offices.  The owners are 
required to file the name of the firm and the names of owners, although this information is kept confidential.  
In addition, firms must file annual tax receipts, which certify that taxes have been paid and that the firm 
continues to exist.  Creditors may inquire only whether the firm is registered and has paid its taxes.  No 
financial information or current ownership information is filed.   7
We determine size using the official EU definitions on micro, small, medium and 
large firms.  The EU definitions provide two classifications: by number of employees and 
the value of total assets and sales.  We do not use the former due to limited information on 
the number of employees provided by Polish firms.  According to the latter definition, we 
identify as “micro” firms with total assets or sales less than 2 million euros; “small” as with 
total assets or sales less than 10 million euros; “medium” as firms with either total assets 
less than 43 million euros or sales less than 50 million euros; and “large” as firms with total 
assets greater than 43 million euros or sales greater than 50 million euros.
6  Based on this 
definition, about 35% of the sample consists of micro firms, while an additional 62% of 
firms can be classified as SMEs.  Large firms constitute only less than 4% of the total 
sample (see Table 1A).  
We also split the sample according to four age categories: 0-1, 2-5, 6-10 and more 
than 10 years since incorporation.  Overall, the firms in our sample can be considered 
relatively young – almost 30% of firms were created during the last 5 years, as can be 
expected in transition countries, and about 60% of all firms have only lived for less than 10 
years.  Furthermore, about 60% of large firms are older than 10 years. Nevertheless, it is 
surprising to find that more than 22% of micro firms have also been in existence for more 
than 10 years.  
Table 1A also disaggregates data by region, legal form, listing and industry type, as 
well as for the year 2002.  As shown in Table 1A, our sample includes a large majority of 
services and manufacturing firms (60% and 38%, respectively).  The remaining 2% of 
firms are mostly agricultural.  Although agriculture is an important sector in Poland, the 
industry appears to be dominated by individual farmers and a few large agribusiness 
corporations.  An interesting feature of the data is the higher concentration of smaller and 
younger firms in the service sector, in contrast to the relatively larger and older firms that 
seem to characterize the industrial sector.  This may relate to the fact that during the Soviet 
era the service sector was underemphasized and almost non-existent; therefore, it is likely 
that this sector may have provided the greatest opportunities for new entrepreneurs.  In 
addition, firms might be attracted to the low costs necessary to enter many service sectors 
versus the difficulties for new firms to access the long-term financing necessary to purchase 
the equipment and machinery needed to enter the manufacturing sector. 
We also find that over 60% of firms in our dataset are limited liability partnerships, 
of which 76% are micro and small firms, an additional 20% are joint-stock companies, and 
the remainder are categorized by the Polish government as ‘non-classified’.  We identify 
three main regions, where almost 50% of the sample is located: Wielkopolskie, Slaskie, and 
Mazowieckie (the largest representation of firms with about 26% of the sample).  Other 
regions are grouped in the “other” category.  In the following chapters we analyze the role 
these firm-level variables play in explaining the dynamics of SME growth and financing. 
The ownership categorization is extracted from data available for the largest owner 
‘type’, i.e. whether the owner is foreign, government, or a domestic company or individual .  
Over half of the firms within the sample are privately owned, while the rest are evenly split 
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between foreign and governmental ownership.  We observe that large firms are owned 
either by the government or by a foreigner (local private investors own only 6% of large 
firms).  Moreover, 85% of firms owned by private investors can be classified as either 
micro or small firms.  Medium firm ownership is more evenly distributed (35% foreign 
owned, 27% in the hands of the government and 38% privately held). 
Table 1B shows summary statistics by ownership structure.  It must be noted that 
ownership information becomes more widely available as we move from micro to large 
firms.  Although there are only few cases of firms which are wholly-owned domestic 
subsidiaries, we observe considerable participation of wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries in 
the sample.
7  This approximates 6%, 9%, 15% and 19% for micro, small, medium and large 
firms respectively.  We find that 40-50% of firms with non-missing ownership information 
have a single domestic shareholder with a stake larger than 50% (i.e. majority shareholder).  
On the other hand, more than 20% of firms have a majority foreign shareholder (this 
percentage is smaller for the micro firms and grows along with firm size).  This implies that 
65% of the sub set of firms with non-missing ownership information, has one majority 
owner, either domestic or foreign.  
Among investors with absolute majority stakes, we can further identify whether they 
are state, individuals or industrial shareholders.  Larger and older firms are primarily held 
by the state.  About 40% of large firms have the state as a majority shareholder; another 
25% of those firms, however, have an industrial majority shareholder. Individuals, on the 
other hand, are majority shareholders of about 45% of micro firms, but hold a majority 
stake only of less than 9% of large firms.  Individuals also hold the greater proportion of 
newborn firms that have a majority shareholder.  
Combining sector and ownership information, we find that the vast majority of 
agricultural firms are held by domestic shareholders (about 70% of the subset for which 
ownership information is available), and, more specifically, by a state majority owner 
(about 55%).  In comparison, firms in the industry and service sectors are more likely to be 
private individuals or corporations.  We further notice that most industrial majority owners 
are foreigners, while most individual investors are domestic. 
Summary Statistics 
Table 2 shows summary statistics for 2002.  Even though the firms in our sample 
are mostly young (with a median age of 9 years) and small (median total assets in PLN 
equal to 8,704), they exhibit significant positive growth rates.  The median growth rate is 
about 5%, although a number of high-growth firms cause an average asset growth is about 
17% a year.  
A potential concern could arise, however, by looking at the low employment growth 
rate.  Both median and average employment growth rates are zero.  Moreover, at least 75% 
of the sample reveals zero employment growth rates at the year 2002.  This is a potential 
                                                 
7 Where wholly-owned domestic (foreign) firms are defined as 100% owned by one domestic (foreign) 
industrial shareholder.   9
alarm since the SMEs represented in the sample are supposed to be the most dynamic and, 
consequently, the greatest contributors to the generation of employment opportunities. 
The sample also shows that firms maintain low leverage ratios.  Intermediated 
financing represents only 2% of assets for the median firm (11% on average), which is 
remarkably low.  This debt is highly concentrated on the short run, which may imply either 
that there is very little access or a lower demand for long-term financing.  On the other 
hand, we observe that firms receive financing from suppliers: account payables represent 
19% of assets (27% on average).  Finally, even though institutional financing is remarkably 
low, our firms exhibit (median) liabilities to total assets ratios of about 61%.  This is likely 
to be explained partially due to the effect of account payables, but also to the inclusion of 
other non-intermediated financing, reported as either other current or other non-current 
liabilities (probably connected to overdue liabilities to the state). 
More than a quarter of the firms in our sample are unprofitable.  The average gross 
margin is actually equal to zero.  The return on assets for this group is about 5% a year, 
which could be considered quite low.  An important caveat to performance data, however, 
is that firms may intentionally under report profitability in order to avoid taxes.   
To summarize, we find firms exhibiting average weak performance, low use of 
(access to) financing, low employment generation, but high growth (in terms of either sales 
or assets).  To understand this cocktail, we will expand our analysis by looking at summary 
statistics by size, age, sector, and ownership structure.  Finally, we will introduce some 
more sophisticated techniques, which can deepen our analysis of firms’ financial structures. 
Summary Statistics by Size 
Table 3A summarizes firm characteristics by size categories.  We first observe is 
that age is increasing in size; i.e. larger firms tend to also be older.  The average age for the 
group of micro firms is between 8 and 9 years old, while it is close to 34 years old for the 
large firms group.  This difference is statistically significant.  The fact that recently 
incorporated firms are much smaller than older firms is likely to be connected to the 
development of the SME sector since the liberalization of the business environment, and 
the assistance of a multitude of international programs.  The growth of the SME sector in 
the post-communist countries has been heralded as one of the prominent success stories of 
East European economies.
8  
Next we observe that the growth rate of employment is increasing in size.   
Moreover, in the aggregate, both micro and small firms exhibit insignificant employment 
growth rates; that is, firms are keeping steady or decreasing employment throughout the 
sample period.  This result may be explained by financing constraints that SMEs face when 
looking for to finance their growth, or rather, to a low employment requirement on their 
specific growth (since SMEs are largely concentrated in the service sector). 
Pissarides (1999) showed that credit constraints limited the growth of SMEs in the 
CEE countries during the 1990s.  We also see in our sample that firms do not have access 
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to long-term funds, but most financing is concentrated in the short run (unless we assume 
that firms voluntarily decided not to borrow long-term).  Additionally, we find the use of 
trade credit to be monotonically decreasing in size, which may also signal low access to 
intermediated credit.  Micro firms, for example, finance 31% of their assets using credit 
from suppliers; while large firms finance only 18% of their assets with this alternative.  
This difference is also significant at the 1% level.  We also observe that the SME sector has 
grown in terms of assets and sales, which shows some investment capacity.  We will 
deepen our understanding of these patterns by looking at the information classified also 
according to age categories. 
  Somewhat surprisingly, we find that smaller firms tent to be more liquid; the 
current ratio for both micro and small firms is substantially higher than the corresponding 
level in large firms, and this difference is statistically significant at conventional levels.  
This may imply a sort of “precautionary” capital structure, given that smaller firms might 
suffer more credit rationing when trying to get auxiliary funding from institutional sources.  
In the same vain, we observe that smaller firms have a much lower percentage of firms with 
coverage ratios below 2; in general, coverage ratios less than 2 suggest a higher risk of 
credit default.  We find that coverage ratios increase with size, with the corresponding 
percentage for large firms being almost twice as high as the one calculated for the sample 
of micro firms.  Lastly, we cannot be conclusive when approaching profitability issues.  
Smaller firms do not significantly differ in terms of profitability from the subset of larger 
firms.  
Summary Statistics by Age 
Table 3A shows firm characteristics by age categories.  We observe that in general, 
new firms experience much higher growth rates.  Our three alternative proxies for growth 
(measured by growth of assets, sales and employment) are monotonically decreasing in age.  
One important conclusion we can get from this observation is that even though we do not 
find that, on average, SMEs contribute to the creation of job opportunities, younger firms 
(which tend to be mostly micro and small firms) do contribute to job creation.  For 
example, micro firms have an employment growth rate of 27%, while firms of more than 
ten years since incorporation exhibit a negative 3%, and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  We can conclude from this observation that SMEs may have 
not generated employment opportunities in the past, but that they seem to have been very 
active in creating jobs in the most recent years. 
We also observe that younger firms use significantly higher trade credit financing 
and provide more credit to their customers.  Additionally, younger firms enjoy a healthier 
financial position; the percentage of firms with coverage ratios below 2 is significantly 
smaller for new firms and increases along with firms’ age.   Finally, profitability does not 
seem to be statistically related to age.  
Summary Statistics by Ownership 
Table 3B identifies three main ownership categories: foreign, government and 
private.  As one might expect, we find that state owned enterprises (SOE) are the oldest   11
firms within the sample.  In addition, SOEs are significantly larger than other private 
domestic firms and employ a much larger work force.  Nevertheless, SOEs exhibit the 
lowest growth rates among all firms we consider.  In particular, they experienced a negative 
employment growth rate in 2002.  This suggests that although SOEs were the largest 
employees in previous years, this may not be the case in the future.   
Another feature of SOEs is that they show the lowest leverage ratio among all 
ownership categories.  This applies to both institutional and commercial financing.  If we 
compare foreign versus domestic private firms, we observe that the latter are younger and 
smaller.  At the same time, local private firms exhibit somewhat higher leverage ratios and 
significantly higher profitability. 
SOEs also experienced negative – and the lowest – profitability in 2002.  Foreign 
and private domestic firms, on the contrary, show significantly positive gross margins and 
return on assets for the same period.  The low profitability of SOEs may be related to their 
choice (or availability) of external financing; but we will postpone this investigation until 
the next section. 
Summary Statistics by Legal Type 
We also contrast firm characteristics by legal types; more specifically, we compare 
limited liability partnerships (LLP) to joint-stock companies.  We find the latter to be older 
and significantly larger than LLPs. We find that joint-stock companies experience much 
lower growth rates in terms of sales, assets and employment.  Moreover, join-stock 
companies exhibit negative average employment growth rates.  LLPs, on their part, 
distinguish themselves by their intense use of trade credit financing.  Finally, LLPs exhibit 
substantially higher profitability ratios. 
Summary Statistics by Sector 
Table 3C identifies firms as operating within three broad sectors: industry, services 
and agriculture.  Industrial firms appear to be, in our sample, significantly older as well as 
larger than other firms.  They have greater assets and sales and employ a much larger work 
force.  In addition, industrial firms seem to exhibit a more compromised financial position: 
a higher percentage of them present low coverage ratios (below 2) and appear to be 
suffering greater liquidity constraints.  An explanation may be that many manufacturing 
firms are privatized large firms coming from the Soviet era, when the service sector was 
underemphasized. According to some studies on privatized firms in transition economies 
(for example, Harper, 1999), relatively larger firms face more difficulties in improving 
performance after privatization. 
None of the identified sectors, in the aggregate, seems to be creating jobs in the year 
2002.  Furthermore, agricultural firms exhibit negative employment growth rate for that 
year. In regard to financing structures, we find that agricultural firms rely more on 
intermediated financing and access to long-term finance; however, as previously 
mentioned, leverage ratios are generally low across all sectors.  The ratio of debt to total 
assets is merely 12%, 10% and 17% for the industry, service and agricultural firms, 
respectively.  Firms in the service sector make the highest use of trade credit.    12
Summary Statistics by Region 
We also identify three main regions.  By looking at the financial ratios by region 
(for the year 2002), we observe that firms in Wielkopolskie (that includes Warsaw) use 
both more intermediated financing and trade credit.  These firms also seem to have higher 
profitability ratios, reaching ROA of 6% (rather than the 4% observed in the other two 
identified regions).  
Evolution of Firms’ Characteristics over Time 
Table 4 shows financing ratios by year.  By looking at the unbalanced sample we 
observe that the average size (as well as the median size) of firms tends to be mostly 
decreasing across years (presenting a peak in 1999).  However, when we look at a constant 
sample (i.e. that includes only firms that are included in the database in all years), we find 
firm size to be actually increasing over time.  This implies that, on the one hand, the firms 
staying in the sample for the whole period are becoming larger as they age.  On the other 
hand, however, new firms entering the sample during this 5-year time span are remarkably 
smaller than those incorporated in the previous years. This is all consistent with the 
expected dynamic of a transition economy. 
Along the same lines, if we look at the constant sample results, we observe that the 
percentage of micro firms within the sample decreases over time; the same happens with 
the sub group of small firms.  This implies that both micro and small firms actually migrate 
to larger categories over time.  However, by looking at the unbalanced sample, we observe 
that more start-ups are being incorporated into the sample over time: the percentage of 
firms with less than a year since incorporation changes from 1.2% to 6.1% in five years 
We do not observe a clear trend regarding the use of intermediated financing over 
time.  However, we do find that trade credit (both used and provided) increases across 
years, as does the ratio of total liabilities over assets (both in average and median terms).  
Firms in the sample seem to be shortening debt maturity for the later periods, which, 
together with the increasing liquidity constraints (proxied by lower current ratios), could 
indicate a weaker financial condition for the average firm.  This result is also consistent 
with the fact that the percentage of firms with coverage ratios below two almost doubles in 
the five-year period. 
  We find that most services firms have been incorporated within our sample period.  
This sector represented half of the sample in 1998, but close to 60% of total firms in 2002.  
Finally, incoming firms are mostly structured as Limited Liability Partnerships. 
Evolution of Firm Characteristics by Size 
Table 5 shows the evolution of firms by size categories.  After noticing that mostly 
micro and small firms enter the sample during the period, we now observe that incoming 
micro firms are also smaller and younger compared to those already incorporated within the 
size category in previous years.  These new firms also tend to make higher use of trade 
credit financing and report higher liabilities to total assets ratios. On the other hand, while 
we do not find that micro firms as a group (as seen in the unbalanced sample) exhibit a   13
deterioration of their financial condition over time (neither the current ratio nor the 
percentage of firms with interest coverage below 2 cause particular concerns), we observe 
that the sub-group of firms that remains in the sample for the whole period do exhibit a 
worsened financial condition, materialized in a much higher percentage of potentially 
distressed firms (growing from about 20% to close to 60%, on average), and lower 
profitability ratios. This may imply that the economic transition could be creating an 
environment that favors the creation of new healthy micro firms, but does not support the 
transition of former SOEs. 
In summary, we find that all firm categories face more compromised financial 
conditions and lower profitability ratios over time and that the problem is more acute if we 
focus on the subset of firms that remains in the sample for the whole period.  Firms that 
have been incorporated into the dataset during the sample period are generally smaller, 
younger and exhibit slightly healthier financial conditions. 
One may wonder if this deteriorated financial and profitability pattern found at the 
aggregate level is the consequence of having one sector or sub-group of firms facing 
particular difficulties, or rather, a more general phenomenon.  To answer this question we 
undertake a more detailed analysis of firms’ financial evolution by sector and age category. 
The results are shown in Figure 1. 
We find that firms in all sectors are growing over time, with manufacturing firms 
being the largest on average within the sample (measured by firms' total assets).  We also 
observe that all firms that are more than one year old have grown over the years.  In 
addition, all sectors have exhibited a decline in their use of intermediated financing during 
the last few years.  Furthermore, debt maturity seems to also be decreasing for all sectors 
and years, although the use of debt financing is almost constant across age and year 
categories.  Finally, we confirm that the deteriorated financial and profitability condition 
we find on average is also present when looking at sub-samples by either sector or age 
categories.  
Patterns of Firms’ Growth 
Table 6 examines growth rates, by year, focusing on three firm characteristics: size, 
profitability and financial structure.  To measure growth rates we work with a constant 
sample, and present both mean and median figures.  We also include the mean and median 
growth rates for the year 2002, computed using all the available information (i.e. the 
unbalanced sample). 
We observe that firms’ average growth (measured either by total assets or sales) is 
consistently positive in each single year we consider, yet, growth rates are somewhat 
decreasing over time. For example, even though the average total assets growth rate is more 
than 25% for the year 1998, it falls to less than 10% after five years. This pattern is also 
found across size and sectors; nevertheless, manufacturing firms generally present smaller 
average growth rates than those exhibited by the service sector. 
Next, we find that profitability growth ratios are negative across all sector and age 
sub-samples.  Moreover, taking the sample as a whole, we find that profitability growth   14
ratios have become increasingly negative over time.  The ratios are still negative but much 
more moderate if we concentrate on median rather than mean indicators; implying that the 
average negative profitability growth rates we observe are strongly influenced by some 
particularly unprofitable firms.  When we compare profitability growth rates across firm 
sizes, we find that despite the fact that small firms were the ones suffering the largest 
negative profit growth rates at the beginning of the sample period, the most negative 
indicators are found among the medium and large sub-groups during the later years.   
Finally, looking at profitability growth rates across sectors, we find again a consistent 
pattern of negative growth rates for each category, with the service sector exhibiting the 
most dramatic decrease. 
To conclude our sample description we examine growth rates related of alternative 
financing choices (such as trade credit, bank financing or other sources).  For the overall 
balanced sample, we find that leverage ratios exhibit positive growth rates in each of the 
sampled years.  However, figures tend to decrease over time (except for a small recovery in 
2002); that is, leverage increases at a decreasing rate.  This positive growth rates in 
leverage ratios is somehow biased towards intermediated financing for the first three years, 
but moves towards trade credit financing at the end of the sample period.  This is exactly 
the case regardless of whether we look at small, medium or large firms.  Also, the same 
pattern is observed both for the manufacturing and service sectors.  
Section 4: Multiple Regression Analysis of Firms’ Capital Structure 
The previous section provides summary statistic that has helped us characterize the 
different groups of firms represented in our sample.  However, to deepen our understanding 
of firms’ capital structure decisions, this univariate analysis is limited.  Since the channel 
through which firm characteristics influence financing decisions could be quite complex, it 
is necessary to observe these relationships in a more synthesized fashion.  This can be 
achieved only with a multiple regression analysis. 
Understanding Firms’ Capital Structure Decisions 
We begin with predictions of the most well known capital structure theories, which 
are found in the financial literature.  The Modigliani-Miller (1958) work on irrelevance of 
capital structure on investment decisions has spurred a wide-range of literature covering the 
determinants of capital structure.  The two most prominent theories that have emerged are 
the Pecking Order Theory of finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and the Trade Off Theory 
(DeAngelo and Masulis 1980).  
We can start by presenting the predictions of the Static Trade Off Theory (STOT) of 
capital structure.  The STOT states that firms determine optimal debt-equity ratios by 
borrowing up to the point where the marginal value of the benefits derived by financing 
with additional debt (tax advantage of interest deductibility/ tax shield
9) is just offset by the 
                                                 
9 Modigliani F and Miller M., Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: a Correction, American 
Economic Review, 53,433-443. Modigliani F and Miller M, 1958, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
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increase in the present value of possible costs associated to financial distress
10 (see Miller 
1977). 
All the same, this theory expects leverage to be positively related to size (inverse 
proxy for volatility and cost of bankruptcy); profits (more profits that need to be protected 
from taxation and lower expected cost of financial distress); and tangibility of the firm’s 
asset structure (again, lower bankruptcy costs). Alternatively, high growth opportunities 
imply a higher cost of financial distress (the value of growth opportunities, which depend 
on future investment decisions, is a poor collateral), suggesting less debt usage. This view 
also predicts lower debt to asset ratios by firms which already enjoy other non-debt tax 
shields (NDTS).  
  A different view of capital structure decisions could be highlighted when we take 
into account the existence of asymmetric information: managers or insiders are assumed to 
count on superior information; more specifically, they are supposed to have a better 
judgment about the firm’s future cash flows or investment opportunities.  
The main approach arising from asymmetric information settings is known as the 
Pecking Order Theory (POT) of financing hierarchy, which presupposes firms do not target 
specific debt ratios; only if internal funds are insufficient they would then turn to external 
financing. The reason behind this behavior is that external financing is costly under 
informational asymmetries between management and investors. Myers and Majluf (1984) 
describe a story in which entrepreneurs who are currently managing some assets need to 
raise funds for undertaking a new project whose profitability is known only to them.  If 
managers act in the interest of old passive shareholders, they may pass up some positive 
NPV investment, avoiding issuing shares at a bargaining price. Potential investors, 
knowing about these incentives, take the not-issuing event as a good symptom and the 
issuance of new shares as a bad sign. Under this scenario of asymmetric information 
affecting firm’s issue-invest decisions, the authors introduce the concepts of the POT. This 
theory predicts that firms would rely first on internal other than external sources of funds 
and, when external financing is needed, they would prefer to issue the safest security first –
i.e. debt–, before equity. Even though the availability of risk-free debt financing would 
make the described problem disappear, risky debt only gets to alleviate the problem –
reducing the states of the world in which a positive NPV is passed up.  
According to the POT more profitable firms borrow less, not because their target 
debt ratio is low –in fact they do not have a target–, but because profitable firms have more 
internal financing available. Myers and Majluf suggest that firms seek to maintain financial 
slack to avoid the need for external funds.  Also, firms with a more tangible asset structure 
are more able to issue low-risk (collateralized) debt, and consequently, would tend to have 
a higher share of debt in their optimal financial structure. 
                                                 
10 Costs of bankruptcy or reorganization that arise when firms’ creditworthiness is in doubt. The sole prospect 
of financial distress can drag down the current market value of the firm. Financial Distress, however, is 
usually understood as the probability of entering financial distress times the cost per se.   16
Eastern European firms are an ideal sample to test this theory, since many countries 
suffer from weak transparency and disclosure requirements, and poor accounting standards 
that exacerbate the information asymmetries. 
The last theory of capital structure we consider is related to Agency Conflicts. Two 
types of conflicts are to be analyzed: those between bondholders and equityholders and 
those involving managers and equityholders. Conflicts between debt and equity holders 
arise when there is risk of default.  It is argued that shareholders may “underinvest” –and 
pass up positive NPV projects if they perceive profits will be used to pay off existing 
debtholders.  This conflict implies that firms will tend to minimize debt or use short-term 
debt in order to limit underinvestment costs.  This cost is more significant among high-
growth firms, i.e. those have more to lose (Myers 1977).  Consequently, we would expect 
to find high-growth firms exhibiting lower (long-term) debt to assets ratios.  
On the other hand, value can also be transferred from creditors to stockholders in 
the face of asset substitution: highly levered equityholders may choose risky investments, 
given that the high returns that could be reached in the “good states”, may avoid the firm 
falling into financial distress; if things happen to go wrong, there is not much to lose, 
anyway. Given that the longer the firm’s history in repaying its debt the better is its 
reputation, we can expect that older, more established firms, would find it optimal to 
choose safer projects (ie. avoiding engagement in asset substitution strategists that could 
lead to losing a valuable reputation
11). Firms with long track records will have lower 
default rates and lower costs of debt than firms with brief histories (Harris and Raviv, 
1991).  
The second kind of conflict is the one that arises between managers and equity 
holders given that managers are believed to favor perk consumption or make inefficient 
investment decisions at the expense of shareholders (Jensen 1986). This problem is bigger 
if the firm has ample free cash flow and lower growth opportunities. Since higher debt 
reduces the equity agency cost, bringing about a greater threat of bankruptcy, monitoring 
from creditors, and lower available free cash flow, it reduces managerial tendency to 
engage in expropriation of private benefits (Grossman and Hart 1982); consequently, 
profitable low growth firms are likely to choose higher debt ratios in order to mitigate this 
problem. Greater concentration of ownership should be associated with lower debt agency 
costs due to lesser divergence between managerial and owner interests. Kim and Sorensen 






                                                 
11 Diamond R., 1989, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, Journal of Political Economy, Aug. 1989, Vol 
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We summarize the predictions of capital structure theories in the following table: 
Leverage Size  Age  Profits  Growth  Tang  NDTS  Growth 
Opportunities
Static Trade Off  +    +    +  -  - 
Peking Order      -    +     
Agency  Conflicts           
Equityholder – Bondholder    + 
If reputation    +    - 




    - 
Much of this literature has been empirically tested, but there is no wide consensus 
on the relevant determinants of capital structure.
12 Fama and French (2002), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels (1998) among others, find that each of the theories 
has some explanatory power and no one can be fully rejected. Booth et. al (2001) also find 
similar relationships when they extend their results to developing countries; they fail, 
however, to take into account the institutional, legal and accounting differences.  More 
recent extensions have introduced the institutional and legal environment as factors 
determining debt levels (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), La Porta et. al (1998), 
among others).  As a result, the factors that have traditionally been used as determinants 
within the setting of developed countries, may not apply in the same fashion when 
considering a country with a wholly different institutional environment.  This is our interest 
in analyzing the determinants of capital structure in one particular case: Poland. 
While most of the above studies focus on large publicly-quoted firms, some 
literature also specifically examines capital structure determinants among SMEs. As 
previously mentioned, a paper by Cressy and Olofsson (1997) finds that smaller businesses 
are more financially risky and consequently face higher difficulties in accessing external 
finance; at the time Scherr, et al. (1990) and Hamilton and Fox (1998) suggest that smaller 
companies limit their issuance of outside equity in order to maintain control.  We will 
analyze how these incentives work in the case of Poland.  
From the supply side, Egerer (1995) analyzes bank lending in the Czech Republic.  
He finds that firms have difficulty borrowing, since corporate performance is not 
transparent and weak creditor rights and collateral laws discourage collateral-based lending.  
He suggests that ownership connections between banks and firms could be beneficial in 
transition economies to overcoming information asymmetries and weak laws.  Although we 
cannot identify the strength of the bank-firm relationship, we do get to some conjectures on 
the supply side story of capital structure in Poland.  
The Capital Structure of Polish Firms 
We now analyze what determines (what explains) the financing decisions of Polish 
firms.  To accomplish this, we need to examine which characteristics of these firms seem to 
be regularly connected with specific choices in the financial structure. 
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We concentrate our regression analysis in the three size categories for which the 
information is more adequate across our sample period: small, medium and large firms (i.e. 
we drop micro firms for this part of the analysis); and we cover the same sample period we 
have been exploring in our summary statistics analysis (i.e. 1998-2002).  
The study begins with two common specifications: Table 7 shows pooled OLS and 
fixed effects regressions.  Fixed effects regressions allow us to observe how time-varying 
firm characteristics explain financing decisions, after accounting for the impact of those 
features (not included, maybe even not clearly identified) that are fixed over time. We 
compute four alternative dependent variables to help us better understand financing 
decisions. We define total debt, short-term debt, long-term debt, and payables ratios, all 
scaled by total assets. 
We observe that size (proxied by the log of firms’ sales) is positively related to all 
of our dependent variables.  That is, larger firms seem to have higher leverage ratios; not 
only intermediated financing (both short and long-term), but also trade credit.  This result is 
only evident in our pooled OLS specification, perhaps because there is little variability in 
firm sizes, so that the influence of size is not captured in the fixed effects model (where 
only the coefficient of trade credit remains positive and statistically significant).  This result 
is consistent with the STOT, according to which larger firms are considered to be subject to 
lower bankruptcy costs. 
Another interpretation for this finding is provided by Dević and Krstić.
13 They 
consider that size might not be a proxy for bankruptcy costs but a proxy for the strength of 
the firm-supplier relationships. Given that a system of intercompany relationships is likely 
to subsist after a decentralization process, and that larger firms might be more active in that 
system, the authors suggest a positive correlation between size and leverage to be a natural 
result.  
Some models include firms’ age as one additional explanatory variable of firms’ 
financial choices. Particularly, we see that under the agency view, age is commonly taken 
as a proxy for firm’s reputation (interpreting that older firms usually have longer financial 
records and therefore, enjoy better access to debt financing). Following this approach, age 
should be positively correlated with firm’s leverage ratios. However, this is not what we 
observe. We find statistically significant negative coefficients; that is, older firms exhibit 
lower leverage ratios.  
A potential interpretation for this finding could be that in the context of a transition 
economy, such as Poland, to be old actually does not imply to be good; or, in other words, a 
long record does not necessarily imply a good record.  Consistent with this conjecture, in 
our descriptive analysis we observed that younger firms actually enjoy healthier financial 
positions: a lower percentage of firms in this category exhibited coverage ratio below 2, 
which is often considered a given critical value of risk by lenders. So, our results suggest 
                                                 
13 Dević A and  Krstić B, 2001,  Comparative analysis of the Capital Structure determinants in Polish and 
Hungarian Enterprises, Empirical Study. Facta Universitatis, Economics and Organization Series, Vol. 1, No 
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that once we control for other firms’ characteristics, new and younger firms are more likely 
to access more credit financing.  
We include the return on assets (ROA) in all regressions as a proxy for profitability. 
This measure presents a negative influence in all four alternative dependent variables. This 
implies that more profitable firms tend to rely less on financing by third parties. The reason 
for this behavior could be explained by the POT of capital structure, according to which 
firms prefer to start covering their financing needs through the use of instruments that are 
less subject to asymmetric information problems.  Since retained earnings is the least 
sensitive source of financing, more profitable firms (generating higher cash flow) may 
choose to postpone the use of debt financing until they exhaust internally generated funds; 
consequently, they tend to exhibit lower leverage ratios in their optimal financial structure.  
The fact that firms’ profitability is negatively associated with leverage ratios, on the 
other hand, goes against the predictions of the STOT.  Another reason for this could be that 
in the polish case, the existence of non-debt tax shields, tax breaks or various incentives (ie. 
Special Economic Zones
14) may reduce the attractiveness of debt financing in achieving tax 
advantage from interest deductibility. Alternatively, given that the Warsaw Stock Exchange 
was not opened until 1991, and that it remains small in regard to market capitalization, it is 
not surprising to find good grounds for the POT to be (more) at work. Firms are likely to 
rely on a sort of hierarchy model, exhausting first all sort of internally generated funds, and 
postponing equity issuance until all the available (expensive) bank credit has been used.  
Another firm characteristic we include is the ratio of fixed to total assets.  This ratio 
is commonly understood as a tangibility measure; that is, it expresses the collateral capacity 
of a given firm. As previously discussed, the STOT of capital structure predicts that firms 
with greater collateral value recognize a lower potential cost of financial distress and, 
consequently, find it optimal to choose a higher share of debt in their financial structure 
(demand side). Consistent with this view, we find that the ratio of fixed to total assets is 
positively related to the firms’ debt to asset ratio. Moreover, the higher this tangibility 
measure is, the greater the long-term debt to asset ratio firms report; and, somewhat 
conversely, the higher the tangibility ratio, the lower the share of short-term debt and trade 
credit share within the firm financial structure.  
An alternative interpretation for this finding may be taken from a supply side 
consideration. This positive connection between tangibility (as well as size) and firms’ 
leverage ratios may simply imply that Polish firms that can offer better collateral, can more 
easily access to long-term financing; at the time that those with less collateral to offer can 
only rely on short-term debt.  
                                                 
14 Law on Special Economic Zones of 20 October 1994 creates the grounds for establishing and operating 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ). It provides the investors operating in the zones with various incentives and 
tax breaks. The most important ones remaining in force in 2001 include a partial or a complete exemption 
from corporate income tax of revenues coming from business operations carried out in a given zone and 
counting some part of investment expenses as an income-generating cost. There are two Special Economic 
Zones in Slaskie: Katowice and Częstochowa.   20
Our regressions also show that firms exhibiting higher growth base a superior share 
of their financial structure on debt. This result is somewhat surprising, if we try to interpret 
it under the agency view. The Agency story predicts that high-growth firms will be likely to 
reduce their reliance on debt financing in order to maintain certain financial flexibility for 
the time when financing needs (likely to arise in case of high-growth firms) come up. 
Moreover, the agency view also suggests that high-growth firms will more likely rely on 
short-term (rather than long-term) debt, in order to maintain the capacity to change the 
financial structure when it becomes optimal to do so. Our results are also opposite to this 
conjecture, since we find that those firms experiencing higher growth rates actually use 
more long-term financing (and do not differentiate from the rest in their use of short-term 
debt). This positive link between firms’ growth and the use of intermediated (long-term) 
debt and trade credit financing can be interpreted as follows: both banks and suppliers 
choose to finance high-growth firms, to share in their future favorable business conditions, 
but at the same time they are reluctant to lend money to non-growing firms (a supply 
effect).  
The STOT, as was previously discussed, suggests that firms look for debt financing 
in order to take advantage of the tax shield derived from the tax deductibility of interest 
expenses; however, a firm already enjoying other sources of tax shields (e.g. depreciation), 
may be less willing to take on debt.  We test this conjecture by introducing a measure of 
non-debt tax shields (NDTS) in our regression model; basically, we compute the ratio of 
depreciation to total assets, and find that this measure is positively related to the short-term 
debt to assets ratio (contrary to the prediction of the STOT). However, once we control for 
firms’ fixed effects, we obtain the expected negative connection between these NDTS and 
both debt and long-term debt to asset ratios.  
The last variable included in the general basic model is a measure of industry 
concentration (computed as the sum of the 5 largest firms’ total sales divided by the total 
sales in the industry). We find a positive association between industry concentration and 
firms’ use of intermediated (long-term) debt. One can expect that firms operating in a 
competitive environment would be subject to a competitive pressure that eventually would 
lead to better performance, making them attractive for financing. Estrin et al (2005) find 
evidence that domestic competitive pressure is associated with better firm performance, 
measured as total factor productivity (TFP), especially in Poland.  We may also think that 
more competitive environments lead firms to struggle more to differentiate from their rivals 
and, consequently, to generate a better reputation (which allows them to access better 
financing terms –again, a supply effect). 
Next, we consider a new specification (reported in Table 8) where we incorporate 
three subsets of dummy variables to our pooled OLS regressions; these three groups are 
meant to identify size (small and medium, with large being the omitted category), 
ownership (foreign and government, with private domestic firms as the omitted variable), 
and region (keeping “other regions” unspecified). We do not run here the fixed effects 
model, since our new explanatory variables would all drop from the regressions, being 
fixed over time.   21
The first thing we observe is that although SMEs do not significantly differentiate 
from large firms in their aggregate leverage ratios (we omit reporting a regression having 
total liabilities as the dependent variable, which does not significantly differ by size
15), they 
do maintain significantly higher short-term debt and account payables to assets ratio. 
Regarding foreign firms, we find that they use significantly higher intermediated (mainly 
long-term) financing; at the time they seem to maintain significantly lower credit from 
suppliers. Another result indicates that governmental firms maintain significantly lower 
leverage ratios (both short- and long-term debt).  From a regional perspective, we do not 
find much variation on financial patterns among the regions we identify.  Long-term 
financing seems to be more intensely used in the Mazoweicke region, at the time that firms 
located in Slaskie appear to fund a lower share of their assets with debt financing, holding 
significantly lower short-term debt. 
A more detailed analysis of firms’ financial choices, by size, is reported in Table 9.  
We observe that the subset of foreign firms which seem to rely more on intermediated 
(long-term) financing are specifically SMEs.  Governmental firms, on the other hand, seem 
to always choose lower debt ratios, regardless of their specific size.  We also observe that 
the relevance of the financial determinants we have examined proves to be more 
unambiguous in the case of SMEs’ financial choices.  Neither size, age, growth 
opportunities, or collateral value have any explanatory power for the leverage ratios chosen 
by large firms within the sample. This finding is not surprising if we stay with our 
interpretation that banks choose to channel their lending towards high growth firms or/and 
firms which can offer good collateral; conditions that are likely to be more crucial when 
referring to the credit supply of SMEs.  Large firms, on the other hand, seem to have 
leverage choices (possibilities) more connected to ownership structure.
16 
By introducing size, region and ownership dummies into the analysis (Table 8), we 
observed that SMEs maintained significantly higher short-term debt (both with banks and 
with suppliers) than large firms.  However, once we run the analysis by sectors, we actually 
find that the previous pattern is only evident within the manufacturing sector.  Small and 
medium manufacturing firms hold debt to assets ratios which are significantly above those 
of large firms; this higher leverage being mostly concentrated on the short-run (See Table 
10). 
Also, Table 10 demonstrates that our previous result showing that foreign firms 
maintained higher long-term debt to assets ratios holds true primarily for the Agricultural 
sector. Even though Manufacturing and Services foreign firms also show long-term debt to 
assets ratios that are higher than those corresponding to private domestic firms within those 
respective sectors, this difference is economically moderate in relative terms; foreign 
Agricultural firms, however, present ratios that are substantially above those we encounter 
in Agricultural companies owned by private domestic investors.  Finally, we observe that 
foreign firms in all sectors tend to hold lower trade credit financing.  
                                                 
15 Results are available from the authors. 
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Finally, by looking at by-sector regressions we observe that size and tangibility are 
better predictors of firms’ financial structures when we refer to either manufacturing or 
services firms. In these cases, both larger and more tangible asset structures are positively 
correlated to the use of debt financing.  Neither of these appears to be relevant, however, in 
the case of agricultural firms. 
The last topic we would like to analyze is related to governance issues.  The sample 
shows a high degree of ownership concentration
17.  This may imply that agency problems 
are low (no minority shareholders to worry about) or that agency problems are high, 
interpreting this concentration as a response to a weak institutional environment (if 
minority shareholders are not able to enforce property rights, shareholders may prefer to 
enter with highly concentrated ownership).  It is important to note that this concern may not 
be extended to firms that have been privatized under the National Investment Funds (NIF) 
program, in which case it was the law that led to high ownership concentration.
18 
To analyze the impact of corporate governance on firms’ capital structure decisions, 
we incorporate two alternative subsets of dummy variables in each of our regressions: the 
first set of dummies identifies firms with majority holding (greater than 50%), owned by 
either a foreign or a private domestic investor. We report these regressions in Table 11. 
The only substantial result we obtain here indicates that firms held by majority 
domestic investors maintain significantly lower leverage ratios than other firms (either with 
a majority foreign or without majority owner).  This result is not surprising given that the 
presence of a large shareholder reduces agency costs between managers and shareholders 
and consequently, the use of debt financing as a tool for limiting managerial discretion and 
its corresponding costs becomes less crucial.  The fact that this is found only for the case of 
domestic majority owners may indicate that foreign investors take different paths when 
dealing with this issue. 
The second set of dummies identifies majorities held by the state, an individual or 
an industrial.  We observe that when the majority owner is the state, firms tend to choose 
higher leverage ratios (both total and short-term debt) and lower use of commercial credit 
(relative to firms without a majority owner).  One reason for this could be that since the 
state is the ultimate owner, the threat of bankruptcy is of lesser importance: state-owned 
firms can be bailed out by the government, which implies a credit guarantee. 
We can summarize our findings related to firms’ financing patterns by identifying 
what we believe to be the two major forces at work: on one side is the “supply” of 
financing and on the other side is the “demand” for external funds.  In the first case, supply 
seems to be predominantly oriented towards firms that can prove profitability, growth, and 
                                                 
17 For the subset of firms with non-missing ownership information, more than 65% have one single owner, 
either domestic or foreigner. 
18 National Investment Funds program, known also as the Mass Privatization Program, is carried out on the 
basis of the Law on National Investment Funds of April 30th, 1993. The goal to transfer part of the selected 
state property to all entitled citizens through the emission of holding share certificates, later converted into the 
shares of national investment funds. 60% of each company’s shares were distributed among 15 funds. In order 
to avoid excessive dispersion, 33% of each company’s shares were vested in 1 of the 15 funds and the other 
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a supporting asset structure.  Demand, in the second case, appears to be mostly connected 
to asymmetric information problems, which lead firms to take financing decisions based on 
a hierarchical structure that gives priority to the use of internally generated funds and 
postpones equity issues until debt capacity has been exhausted.  As a result, we find that 
larger, more tangible, growing, profitable young firms to be the ones making relatively 
heavier use of debt in their financial structures.   
Section 5: Conclusions 
This study shows that Polish firms in the aggregate experience high growth, but 
average weak performance and low employment generation.  In addition, firms seem to 
maintain low leverage ratios, with a small share of intermediated financing in general, and 
less long-term financing in particular.   
We find that SMEs are generally younger and less prone to create job opportunities, 
in the aggregate.  However, newly created SMEs are found to be the most active 
employment generators.  That is, although SMEs do not appear to have been dynamic 
employers in the past, they have proved to be intense promoters of job opportunities in 
recent years.  Small firms generally receive a substantial part of their financing structure 
from suppliers and provide significant financing to their customers.  They are found to be 
somewhat financially healthier, with a lower percentage of firms with coverage ratios 
indicating the risk of default.  
Regarding the consequences of varied ownership structures, we find that state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) are the oldest within the sample; they are significantly larger and 
employ a much larger work force.  Nevertheless, SOEs exhibit the lowest growth rates 
among all firms we consider, experiencing negative employment growth rates. This implies 
that even though these firms might have been the big employers in prior years, their 
importance has diminished over time.  SOEs also have the lowest leverage and profitability 
ratios among all ownership categories (at the year 2002). Foreign and private domestic 
firms, on the contrary, exhibit positive profitability measures for the same period. Domestic 
private firms are generally younger and smaller, and present somewhat higher leverage and 
profitability ratios. Nevertheless, we find all firm categories facing more compromised 
financial conditions and lower profitability ratios over time.  
Finally, we test some key theories of capital structure.  We believe these results to 
be particularly interesting, since there are only few studies that cover such a large sample of 
SMEs, located in any country other than the US.  We observe that larger firms generally 
exhibit greater leverage ratios; however, opposite to what is suggested by the agency view, 
older firms actually present lower leverage figures.  This could be a special feature of 
transition economies, where age is not precisely a valid proxy for good reputation.  We also 
find leverage ratios to be positively related to tangibility, growth and industry 
concentration.  One reason behind these relations is likely to be connected to the supply 
side: after liberalization, potential financiers choose to direct their credit towards younger, 
healthier and growing firms, so that they can share in their good future. Also, they are 
prone to favor firms with a higher collateral base, to ensure recovery. On the demand side, 
firms appear to be mostly influenced by asymmetric information problems, which lead   24
them to take financing decisions based on a hierarchical structure, giving priority to the use 
of internally generated funds, and postponing equity issues until debt capacity has been 
exhausted. This contributes to our main empirical finding that larger, younger, growing, 
more profitable and tangible firms are relatively heavier users of debt in their financial 
structures.    25
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 Table 1 Panel A:  Distribution of Firms in the Study (Year 2002) 
 
This sample includes all nonfinancial, publicly traded, private and government owned firms. This table presents year 2002 distribution of firms in the sample across size categories. 
Size is determined using the official EU definitions; Micro firms are those with total assets or sales less than € 2 million; Small firms are those with total assets or sales less than € 
10 million, Medium size firms with either total assets less than € 43 million or sales less than € 50 million and Large firms with total assets greater than  € 43 million or sales 
greater than € 50 million. Age is the number of years since incorporation. Industry Type "Others" includes fishing and  forestry       
     
    Proportion of firms:     
   Total Micro  Small Medium  Large Total 
Total for all sample  15,315  34.74%  37.96%  23.89%  3.40%  100.00% 
   Wielkopolskie  1,806  4.42%  4.60%  2.42%  0.35%  11.79% 
Region Slaskie  1,635  2.72%  4.24%  3.38%  0.34%  10.68% 
   Mazowieckie  3,961  9.72%  8.43%  6.39%  1.32%  25.87% 
   Other  7,912  17.88%  20.69%  11.71%  1.39%  51.67% 
   0-1  849  4.06%  1.40%  0.55%  0.05%  6.07% 
Age 2-5  3,149  10.99%  7.34%  3.95%  0.22%  22.50% 
   6-10  4,432  11.40%  11.65%  7.58%  1.03%  31.66% 
   10+  5,568  8.60%  17.22%  11.77%  2.19%  39.78% 
Industry type  Manufacturing  5,817  10.22%  15.19%  10.57%  2.02%  38.00% 
   Services  9,183  23.46%  22.03%  13.12%  1.37%  59.98% 
   Agriculture  284  0.95%  0.70%  0.20%  0.01%  1.86% 
   Others*  25  0.10%  0.04%  0.01%  0.01%  0.16% 
   Foreign  1,393  4.72%  6.96%  7.50%  2.18%  21.36% 
Ownership Government  1,296 2.22%  9.71%  5.86% 2.09%  19.87% 
   Private  3,832  32.37%  17.70%  8.17%  0.52%  58.76% 
Legal Form   Limited Liability Partnership  9,612  25.47%  22.44%  13.59%  1.26%  62.76% 
   Joint-Stock Companies   3,048  4.11%  7.72%  6.20%  1.87%  19.90% 
   Not Classified  2,655  5.16%  7.80%  4.09%  0.27%  17.34% 
Listed Yes  178  0.00%  0.18%  0.56%  0.42%  1.16% 
   No  15,137  34.74%  37.78%  23.33%  2.98%  98.84% 
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Table 1 Panel B: Summary Statistics by  Ownership Structure (Year 2002) 
 
This table presents the ownership distribution of firms across size and age. Total N° of Firms is described as the Total N° of firms in the corresponding categories; Percentage of 
firms with non-missing information = (N°. Non-missing Firms/Total Number of Firms). Wholly-Owned foreign (domestic) is defined as 100% owned by one foreign (or domestic) 




Firms  By Size*  By Age  By Sector   By Ownership  








Age >10  % Industry  % Services  %Agriculture  Foreign  Government  Private 
% of total firms with nonmissing 
obs* 27%  17.51%  28.05%  35.04%  52.98%  17.55%  27.05%  30.89% 25.35% 31.01% 24.12%  33.45% 61.95% 85.26% 22.12% 
Total # firms  15,315  5,321  5,814  3,659  521  849  3,149  4,432  5,568  5,817  9,183  284  1,393  1,296  3,832 
                                          
% of Firms:                                              
With 1 shareholder  56.23  49.39  61.06  59.09  52.02  44.99  52.37  53.36  62.43  56.39  56.03  59.15  20.46  70.45  33.79 
With 2-5 shareholders  42.92  49.86  38.20  40.15  44.15  54.53  46.78  45.96  36.48  42.63  43.16  40.85  78.89  29.32  65.92 
With more than 5 shareholders  0.86  0.75  0.74  0.77  3.84  0.47  0.86  0.68  1.10  0.98  0.79  0.00  0.65  0.23  0.29 
                                         
Wholly-owned foreign 
subsidiary**  11.21  6.76  9.26  15.21  19.20  6.71 11.85  15.70 6.44 11.09 11.73  1.05 53.53  -  - 
Wholly-owned domestic subsidiary  1.55  1.61  0.86  2.57  0.72  1.34  2.00  1.68  0.64  1.33  1.81  0.00  -  -  7.55 
                                         
>50% 1 domestic shareholder  46.71  48.93  50.71  41.03  42.03  44.30  32.98  36.60  66.57  46.67  45.67  69.47  -  97.92  99.41 
>50% 1 foreign shareholder  20.58  15.99  17.41  25.66  31.16  21.48  22.07  27.98  11.54  20.79  21.12  4.21  96.18  1.63  - 
                                         
>50% 1 state shareholder  26.69  11.48  34.40  25.20  39.49  18.79  9.74  18.63  46.18  29.55  23.01  54.74  -  99.55  - 
>50% 1 individual shareholder  25.77  44.31  22.07  20.67  8.70  35.57 29.34 26.59 22.88 23.34 28.16  17.89 33.14  -  91.51 
>50% 1 industrial shareholder  13.64  8.37  10.36  19.27  24.64  8.72 14.32  18.04 8.43 13.69 14.12  1.05 57.47  -  7.78 
                                               
Shareholding of largest shareholder 
(%)  69.57  60.97  72.75  78.79  79.98  61.22 68.72 71.67 69.33 72.56 67.59  70.24 83.63 93.85 62.67 
Cummulative shareholding of top 3 
shareholders (%)  82.52  83.95  83.22  77.74  64.18  87.29 85.56 82.70 78.43 81.48 83.25  78.93 87.08 77.21 86.91 
Cummulative shareholding of top 5 
shareholders  (%)  83.24  87.61  83.57  72.21  62.64  91.90 89.34 84.85 76.07 83.30 83.13  86.09  100.00  81.56 89.67   32
Table 2:  Summary Statistics (Year 2002) 
 
 




Observations  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Min p5 p25  Median  p75  p95  Max 
Age  13,998  16.60 26.51  0.00 1.00 5.00 9.00 13.00 57.00  761.00 
Total Assets (PLN)  15,315  53,537  476,805  1  303  1,889  8,704  24,872  155,232  36,900,000
1-Yr Asset growth  12,836  0.17  0.58  -1.00  -0.35  -0.07  0.05  0.24  0.99  3.74 
Total Sales (PLN)  15,179  65,055  390,946  1  892  3,920  13,854  37,939  203,651  26,300,000
1-Yr Sales growth  12,629  0.24  1.08  -1.00  -0.45  -0.11  0.03  0.20  1.37  7.33 
Employment 11,944  239  1,440  1  5  26  82  200  800  101,985 
1-Year Employment Growth  9,847  0.00  0.22  -1.00  -0.28  -0.06  0.00  0.00  0.33  1.13 
Debt to total assets  15,051  0.11  0.17  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.16  0.46  0.94 
Payables to total assets  15,185  0.27  0.27  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.19  0.42  0.84  1.11 
Liabilities to total assets  12,942  0.64  0.38  0.03  0.11  0.37  0.61  0.84  1.29  2.04 
Long-term debt to total assets  15,051  0.04  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.24  0.72 
Long-term debt to total debt  8,248  0.28  0.36  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.56  1.00  1.00 
Current  Ratio  15,263 1.72 2.11  0.00  0.32  0.81  1.13  1.74  4.92 14.55 
Percentage of firms with interest coverage less 
than 2  15,315  52.20  49.95  -  -  -  -  -  -    
Asset Tangiblility  14,922  0.36  0.27  0.00  0.01  0.11  0.32  0.56  0.84  1.00 
Receivables to total assets  15,309  0.32 0.23 0.00  0.03 0.13 0.27  0.47 0.77  0.90 
Earnings/Sales 15,156  0.00  0.20  -1.27  -0.25  -0.01  0.02  0.06  0.19  0.41 
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Table 3 Panel A: Mean Summary  Statistics by Size and Age (Year 2002) 
            
This table reports mean figures for year 2002 across size and age. Size is determined using the official EU definitions; Micro firms are those with total assets or sales less than € 2 
million; Small firms are those with total assets or sales less than € 10 million, Medium size firms with either total assets less than € 43 million or sales less than € 50 million and 
Large firms with total assets greater than € 43 million or sales greater than € 50 million. All financial ratios are corrected for outliers at the 1% or 5% critical levels. Significance at 
1%, 5 % and 10% levels is represented as ***,  **,  * respectively ; NS means differences are  not significant.   
           
   Size        Age    









              
t-test       
Small vs 
Large 
t-test      
Micro vs 
Large             
t-test       
New vs 
>10 
% of total firms with nonmissing obs  34.73%  37.98%  23.88%  3.40%       6.06%  22.50%  31.66%  39.78%    
# firms  5,321  5,814  3,659  521       849  3,149  4,432  5,568    
                          
Age 8.36  18.58  23.03  34.01  ***  *** 0.83  3.32  8.19  33.20  *** 
Total Assets (PLN)  2,265  15,816  62,908  932,300 ***  *** 12,499  24,741 44,616 85,304  *** 
1-Yr Asset growth  0.19  0.15  0.19  0.17 NS  NS  0.62  0.29  0.13  0.11 *** 
Total Sales (PLN)  3,099  18,790  93,022  1,008,975 ***  ***  17,206 33,863  57,264  97,184  *** 
1-Yr Sales growth  0.38  0.16  0.22 0.25  **  *  2.33 0.47  0.15  0.04  *** 
Employment 32  141  307  2,132  ***  ***  98  119  166  344  ** 
1-Year Employment Growth  -0.01  -0.01 0.02  0.03  ***  ***  0.27  0.07  0.02  -0.03  *** 
Debt to total assets  0.09  0.11  0.13 0.12  NS ***  0.09 0.11  0.11  0.10  *** 
Payables to total assets  0.31  0.26 0.27  0.18  ***  ***  0.36  0.34  0.28  0.22  *** 
Liabilities to total assets  0.67  0.61 0.64  0.60 NS  ***  0.67  0.72  0.63  0.59  *** 
Long-term debt to total assets  0.06  0.07 0.06  0.06 NS  **  0.05 0.09  0.06  0.05  NS 
Long-term debt to total debt  0.31  0.29 0.26  0.30 NS  NS  0.29  0.35  0.29  0.25  * 
Current Ratio  2.12  1.59  1.41  1.32 ***  ***  1.95  1.77  1.82  1.60 *** 
Percentage of firms with interest 
coverage< 2  37.04  56.24  64.96  72.36 ***  ***  34.75  49.06  50.32  57.70 *** 
Asset Tangiblility  0.29  0.39  0.39 0.46  *** ***  0.26 0.32  0.34  0.40  *** 
Receivables to total assets  0.36  0.30 0.31  0.24  ***  ***  0.39  0.35  0.33  0.28  *** 
Earnings/Sales -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02 NS  ***  -0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.00 ** 
Return on Assets  0.04  0.05  0.05 0.04  *  NS  0.07 0.04  0.06  0.04  *** 
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Table 3 Panel B: Mean Summary Statistics  by Ownership Structure and Legal Form (Year 2002) 
 
This table reports summary mean statistics for year 2002 according to ownership structure and legal form. LLP stands for Limited Liability Partnership.  All financial ratios are 
corrected for outliers at the 1% or 5% critical levels. Significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels is represented as ***,  **,  * respectively ; NS means differences are  not significant 
 
 








t-test         
Foreign  vs 
Government 
t-test       
Foreign 
vs Private 










LLP  vs 
Joint-Stock 
% of total firms with nonmissing obs  21.36%  19.90%  58.75%          62.78% 19.97%    
# firms  1,393 1,296  3,832        9,614 3,058    
                      
Age  12.14 33.63  9.40  *** *** ***  9.61  32.47  *** 
Total Assets (PLN)  120,882  176,509  14,781  NS  ***  ***  28,785  144,918  *** 
1-Yr Asset growth  0.22  0.14  0.21  ***  NS  ***  0.19  0.14  *** 
Total Sales (PLN)  142,271  151,559  26,057  NS  ***  ***  42,364  153,249  *** 
1-Yr Sales growth  0.31  0.12  0.38  ***  NS  ***  0.31  0.17  *** 
Employment  315  688  97 *** *** *** 140.25  416.02  *** 
1-Year Employment Growth  0.03  -0.04  0.04  ***  NS  ***  0.02  -0.03  *** 
Debt to total assets  0.11  0.07  0.13  ***  **  ***  0.11  0.12  ** 
Payables to total assets  0.31  0.13  0.33  ***  ***  ***  0.30  0.22  *** 
Liabilities to total assets  0.68  0.47  0.68  ***  NS  ***  0.66  0.64  ** 
Long-term debt to total assets  0.07  0.04  0.07  ***  NS  ***  0.07  0.05  *** 
Long-term debt to total debt  0.27  0.31  0.30  **  *  NS  0.30  0.23  *** 
Current Ratio  1.80  1.46  1.76  ***  NS  ***  1.78  1.64  *** 
Percentage of firms with interest 
coverage<  2  56.64 64.74  43.06  *** *** ***  50.36  66.11  *** 
Asset  Tangiblility  0.30  0.59  0.28  *** *** ***  0.32  0.38  *** 
Receivables to total assets  0.35  0.18 0.37  ***  *** ***  0.35 0.28  *** 
Earnings/Sales  0.00  -0.03  0.02  *** *** ***  0.01  -0.04  *** 
Return  on  Assets  0.05  -0.01  0.08  *** *** ***  0.06  0.00  *** 
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Table 3 Panel C: Mean Summary Statistics by Sector and Region (Year 2002) 
 
This table reports summary mean statistics for year 2002 according to sector classification and location. All financial ratios are corrected for outliers at the 1% or 5% critical levels; 
forestry and fishing are left out in the sector categories. Significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels is represented as ***,  **,  * respectively; NS means difference is not significant 
     
          













































% of total firms with 
nonmissing obs  38.00%  59.98%  1.85%         11.79%  10.68%  25.87%  51.67%        
# firms  5,817  9,183  284         1,806  1,635  3,961  7,912        
                                
Age 22.62  12.84  14.73  ***  ***  NS  16.52  20.99  12.48  17.84  ***  ***  *** 
Total Assets (PLN)  68,839  44,742  16,960  ***  **  NS  38,694  52,222  93,300  37,297  NS  ***  * 
1-Yr Asset growth  0.16  0.18  0.15  **  NS NS  0.17  0.15  0.18  0.17  NS  NS  * 
Total Sales (PLN)  81,481  55,965  14,353  ***  **  **  49,424  71,597  102,433  48,769  ***  ***  * 
1-Yr Sales growth  0.21  0.26  0.15  **  NS  NS  0.22  0.14  0.28  0.25  **  *  *** 
Employment 290  202  90  ***  ***  NS  169  290  361  201  ***  **  NS 
1-Year Employment Growth  0.00  0.00  -0.04  NS  **  **  0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  *  NS  * 
Debt to total assets  0.12  0.10  0.17  ***  ***  ***  0.11  0.09  0.09  0.12  ***  ***  NS 
Payables to total assets  0.23  0.31  0.16  ***  ***  ***  0.31  0.28  0.29  0.26  ***  ***  NS 
Liabilities to total assets  0.60  0.66  0.54 ***  ***  ***  0.65  0.64  0.68 0.61  NS  **  ** 
Long-term debt to total assets  0.06  0.06 0.08  NS ***  **  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.06  ***  NS  *** 
Long-term debt to total debt  0.29  0.28  0.32 *  NS  NS  0.29 0.23  0.27  0.30  ***  NS  *** 
Current Ratio  1.67  1.73  2.31  NS  ***  ***  1.65  1.50  1.96  1.67  **  ***  *** 
Percentage of firms with 
interest coverage< 2  56.61  49.48  50.70  ***  **  NS  50.33  60.37  46.40  53.84  ***  ***  *** 
Asset Tangiblility  0.42  0.31 0.49  *** ***  ***  0.35  0.35 0.29  0.39  NS  ***  *** 
Receivables to total assets  0.29  0.34 0.16  *** ***  ***  0.33  0.36 0.34  0.30  ***  *  *** 
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Table 4:  Mean Summary Statistics, by Year. Balanced and Unbalanced Sample 
 
This table reports mean summary statistics by year on both balanced and unbalanced samples during the 1998-2002 period.  A 
breakdown by size, age, sector, region and legal form categories is showed. In Agriculture sector missing category is 
fishing/forestry.  
    
   Unbalanced Sample  Balanced Sample 
   MEAN  MEAN 
    1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 
# of Firms (with non-misssing 
total assets)  5,757  7,517  9,820  14,281  15,315  4,367  4,367 4,367 4,367 4,367 
Age  23.06  22.80  20.62  17.34  16.60  23.98  24.99 25.99 26.98 27.99 
Total  Assets  (PLN)  44,515  69,326  62,824  56,092  53,537  49,482  57,305 63,445 65,654 69,120 
Total  Sales  (PLN)  62,559  87,821  78,842  68,008  65,044  69,011  77,827 86,485 88,406 91,729 
Debt to total assets  0.16  0.17  0.18  0.16  0.11  0.18  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.15 
Payables to total assets  0.23  0.25  0.27  0.28  0.27  0.22  0.23  0.23  0.22  0.22 
Liabilities to total assets  0.56  0.59  0.61 0.63 0.64 0.58  0.60 0.61 0.61 0.62 
Long-term debt to total assets  0.06  0.08  0.07  0.06  0.04  0.09  0.09 0.08 0.08 0.05 
Long-term debt to total debt  0.32  0.31  0.31  0.29  0.28  0.32  0.31  0.29  0.28  0.24 
Current  Ratio  1.73  1.63  1.67  1.73  1.72  1.76  1.69 1.66 1.70 1.59 
Percentage of firms with 
interest coverage <2  27.17  41.43  41.09  41.27  52.19  26.68  40.78 44.43 47.66 63.54 
Asset Tangiblility  0.40  0.40  0.38  0.36 0.36 0.42  0.41 0.40 0.40 0.42 
Receivables to total assets  0.27  0.29  0.30 0.31 0.32 0.27  0.28 0.29 0.29 0.28 
EBIT/Sales  0.02  0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.03  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 
Return  on  Assets  0.09  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.10  0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 
Size Categories **                        
%  Micro  10.48  10.99 19.08  29.52  34.73  8.95  8.47 7.33 6.50 7.53 
%  Small  55.62  54.08  46.87  40.77  37.98  53.40  52.58 49.00 46.92 47.29 
%  Medium  30.97  31.07  30.25  26.15  23.88  34.30  35.24 39.07 41.06 39.73 
%  Large  2.93  3.87  3.81  3.56  3.4  3.34  3.71 4.60 5.52 5.45 
Age Categories                        
%  Age  0-1  1.23  3.91  6.14  9.36  6.06  1.29  0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% Age 2-5  25.22  18.45  18.62  19.59  22.5  24.89  16.91  11.21  5.56  1.29 
%  Age  6-10  36.27  40.79  39.37  36.12  31.66  34.76  42.09 44.03 42.58 35.42 
%  Age  >10  37.28  36.85  35.87  34.93  39.78  39.06  40.85 44.76 51.92 63.29 
Sector Types***                        
%  Manufacturing  47.81  45.44  41.58  38.55  38  48.05  48.05 48.05 48.05 48.05 
%  Services  50.33  53.03  56.83  59.45  59.98  50.25  50.25 50.25 50.25 50.25 
%  Agriculture  *  1.8  1.48  1.53  1.89  1.85  1.67  1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 
Regions                         
%  Wielkopolskie  10.50  10.36  9.20  11.14  11.79  10.35  10.35 10.35 10.35 10.35 
%  Slaskie  13.01  13.06  11.06  8.73  10.68  13.49  13.49 13.49 13.49 13.49 
%  Mazowiecke  21.60  22.55  24.89  26.32  25.86  22.60  22.60 22.60 22.60 22.60 
%  Others  54.89  54.03  54.85  53.81  51.67  53.56  53.56 53.56 53.56 53.56 
Legal Form                  
% Limited Liability 
Partnerships 49.39  49.69  53.34  59.73  62.75       
% Joint-Stock Companies 
(listed/private)  37.73 35.66  29.18  22.25 19.90     
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Table 5: Mean  Summary Statistics by Year & Size. Balanced and Unbalanced Sample 
 
This table reports mean summary statistics across time according to size for both the balanced and unbalanced samples 
during the 1998-2002 period.  
 
   UNBALANCED  MEAN  BALANCED  MEAN 
    1998  1999 2000 2001 2002  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Micro Firms:                        
# of Firms (with non-misssing total assets)  602  824  1,872  4,214  5,321  391  370  320  284  329 
Age    15.60  15.53  9.81  8.21  8.36 15.31 17.61 18.19  19.40 19.91 
Total Assets (PLN)  9,723  8,712  4,161  2,390  2,265  10,669  5,717  3,715  2,514  11,679 
Total Sales (PLN)  4,015  4,174  3,161  2,777  3,099  3,712  4,320  4,244  3,633  4,582 
Debt to total assets  0.13  0.15  0.14  0.14  0.09  0.17  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.13 
Payables to total assets  0.19  0.22  0.27  0.31  0.31  0.20  0.20  0.22  0.22  0.20 
Liabilities to total assets  0.54  0.57  0.61  0.66  0.67  0.60  0.64  0.66  0.66  0.65 
Long-term debt to total assets  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.03  0.12  0.11  0.10  0.07  0.07 
Long-term debt to total debt  0.33  0.33  0.31  0.30  0.31  0.37  0.35  0.28  0.26  0.30 
Current  Ratio  2.36  2.30  2.32  2.20  2.12 2.38 2.31 2.22  2.28 2.29 
Percentage of firms with interest coverage <2  18.77  34.71  25.75  27.12  37.04  18.93  35.41  38.13  38.73  58.36 
Asset  Tangiblility  0.38  0.36  0.31  0.30  0.29 0.34 0.35 0.34  0.32 0.34 
Receivables to total assets  0.26 0.28  0.32  0.34  0.36  0.27 0.28 0.31  0.31 0.29 
EBIT/Sales  0.04  0.07  0.03  0.04  0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02  -0.06 -0.10 
Return  on  Assets  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00  -0.04  -0.05 
Small Firms:                               
# of Firms (with non-misssing total assets)  3,201  4,067  4,604  5,822  5,814  2332  2296  2140  2049  2065 
Age  21.37  20.89  21.08  18.60  18.58 21.77 23.67 25.09  26.15 27.77 
Total Assets (PLN)  14,048  15,353  15,949  15,217  15,816  15,360  16,933  16,427  16,540  17,015 
Total Sales (PLN)  19,731  21,723  21,436  18,818  18,790  20,389  22,407  22,250  20,384  20,289 
Debt to total assets  0.14  0.16  0.16  0.15  0.11  0.17  0.18  0.18  0.17  0.14 
Payables to total assets  0.22  0.24  0.25  0.26  0.26  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.20  0.21 
Liabilities to total assets  0.54  0.57  0.58  0.61  0.61  0.57  0.58  0.58  0.58  0.61 
Long-term debt to total assets  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.05 
Long-term debt to total debt  0.32  0.32  0.31  0.28  0.29  0.33  0.31  0.30  0.28  0.23 
Current  Ratio  1.76  1.64  1.62  1.63  1.59 1.82 1.74 1.77  1.78 1.60 
Percentage of firms with interest coverage <2  22.74  39.49  40.18  42.61  56.24  21.52  38.64  39.38  43.50  63.48 
Asset  Tangiblility  0.41  0.40  0.39  0.38  0.39 0.43 0.42 0.41  0.42 0.43 
Receivables to total assets  0.27 0.28  0.29  0.30  0.30  0.26 0.27 0.28  0.27 0.26 
EBIT/Sales  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02  0.00 0.00 
Return  on  Assets  0.11  0.08  0.06  0.04  0.05 0.11 0.08 0.06  0.03 0.03 
Medium Firms:                            
# of Firms (with non-misssing total assets)  1,785  2,335  2,970  3,737  3,659  1498  1539  1706  1793  1735 
Age  27.24  26.82  24.93  23.04  23.03 28.39 28.04 27.84  28.11 28.91 
Total Assets (PLN)  57,078  69,938  62,061  58,146  62,908  58,879  68,933  63,942  58,992  65,633 
Total Sales (PLN)  89,859  102,094  96,989  89,199  93,022  90,442  96,148  95,865  88,042  92,246 
Debt to total assets  0.19  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.13  0.21  0.22  .2231423  0.22  0.16 
Payables to total assets  0.27  0.28  0.29  0.29  0.27  0.26  0.27  0.27  0.25  0.24 
Liabilities to total assets  0.60  0.62  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.59  0.62  0.63  0.63  0.64 
Long-term debt to total assets  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.04  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.05 
Long-term debt to total debt  0.29  0.29  0.29  0.27  0.26  0.30  0.30  0.27  0.26  0.23 
Current  Ratio  1.51  1.43  1.38  1.43  1.41 1.54 1.51 1.47  1.55 1.48 
Percentage of firms with interest coverage <2  36.69  46.25  50.64  52.90  64.96  35.58  44.10  50.38  52.37  64.27 
Asset  Tangiblility  0.39  0.39  0.38  0.37  0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39  0.39 0.41 
Receivables to total assets  0.29 0.30  0.32  0.32  0.31  0.28 0.30 0.31  0.32 0.30 
EBIT/Sales  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02  0.02 0.02 
Return  on  Assets  0.10  0.07  0.06  0.05  0.05 0.10 0.08 0.07  0.06 0.05 
Large Firms                               
# of Firms (with non-misssing total assets)  169  291  374  508  521  146  162  201  241  238 
Age  35.20  35.36  33.04  35.29  34.01 34.53 30.64 31.58  34.08 33.81 
Total Assets (PLN)  612,840  990,365  939,542  954,906  932,300  602,044  636,858  654,913  607,195  626,020 
Total  Sales  (PLN)  797,403 1,130,371 1,010,506 1,009,084 1,008,975 799,664 856,669 819,397  766,003 819,763 
Debt to total assets  0.21  0.23  0.23  0.22  0.12  0.21  0.25  .2630569  0.25  0.14 
Payables to total assets  0.19  0.20  0.21  0.19  0.18  0.19  0.22  0.22  0.20  0.20 
Liabilities to total assets  0.53  0.57  0.59  0.61  0.60  0.50  0.60  0.61  0.64  0.61 
Long-term debt to total assets  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.05  0.09  0.13  0.14  0.12  0.05 
Long-term debt to total debt  0.36  0.39  0.37  0.36  0.30  0.39  0.39  0.36  0.33  0.27 
Current  Ratio  1.22  1.24  1.35  1.29  1.32 1.26 1.25 1.28  1.35 1.26 
Percentage of firms with interest coverage <2  39.05  49.48  53.48  57.87  72.36  38.36  51.85  57.71  58.51  65.97 
Asset  Tangiblility  0.52  0.49  0.45  0.46  0.46 0.52 0.51 0.48  0.47 0.47 
Receivables to total assets  0.21 0.22  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.21 0.22 0.24  0.24 0.23 
EBIT/Sales  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.01 0.02 
Return  on  Assets  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04  0.04 0.05 
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Table 6: Balanced Sample Growth Rates, by Year 
This table reports mean and median growth rates on size, profitability and financial structure for the balanced sample. All financial ratios are corrected for outliers at the 1% or 5% 
critical levels. All Firm mean and median figures for year 2002 based on unbalanced sample. 
 
   All Firms  Balanced Sample 
   Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
    2002  2002  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Nominal growth rate of                                
Total Assets (%)  17.10  5.05  25.36  19.22  14.36  5.10  9.95  11.38  9.63  6.18  1.25  3.96 
Sales (%)  24.18  2.65  26.60  15.15  14.26  3.94  3.86  12.59  8.07  7.34  0.00  0.02 
Earnings (before interest and tax) (%)  -120.76  -20.55  -58.67  -92.76 -126.36  -76.00  -142.58  -10.81  -15.59  -22.93  -27.92  -23.46 
Payables  (%)  46.79  3.41  61.80 59.59  45.34 20.99  27.15 15.98 20.61 12.88  1.20  2.95 
Total Debt (%)  37.78  -13.84  130.21  85.42  92.02  33.92  3.27  24.44  12.77  7.80  -4.35  -16.77 
Liabilities (%)  27.38  6.39  38.34  33.67  19.97  8.04  17.59  16.74  16.02  7.77  -0.30  4.18 
                               
Small Firms:                               
Total Assets (%)  14.89  4.97  21.75  17.00  12.78  3.68  7.66  9.99  8.72  4.87  -0.34  3.27 
Sales (%)  16.48  1.31  21.51  12.38  10.66  -0.82  1.34  10.86  5.94  5.05  -2.75  -2.62 
Earnings (before interest and tax) (%)  -97.24  -19.32  -100.56  -104.07 -65.10 -62.96  -105.99 -13.62 -16.64 -23.08 -35.37  -26.77 
Payables  (%)  38.61  2.41  60.70 58.08 45.35 22.59 19.25 14.76 20.43 10.84  0.95  -0.03 
Total Debt (%)  42.69  -12.13  116.48  74.14  100.94  36.30  -2.19  18.29  8.71  9.06  -7.70  -17.47 
Liabilities (%)  22.98  6.75  36.63  30.40  17.83  6.52  16.25  14.24  13.05  5.58  -2.09  3.61 
                               
Medium and Large Firms                               
Total Assets (%)  18.60  7.75  29.24  23.05  16.32  7.25  13.02  13.93  11.67  8.48  3.19  5.89 
Sales (%)  22.07  6.12  30.41  18.78  18.17  7.55  8.33  15.16  11.44  9.94  4.08  3.35 
Earnings (before interest and tax) (%)  -128.02  -11.42  -18.85  -83.59 -209.52  -79.18 -148.09  -5.88  -9.20  -20.92  -18.20  -16.96 
Payables  (%)  43.32  8.63  50.01 60.75 42.32 17.16 33.76 15.85 20.78 14.77  1.83  7.51 
Total Debt (%)  38.42  -12.99  145.33  94.00  87.55  33.71  7.68  31.56  17.56  7.98  -2.32  -16.88 
Liabilities (%)  26.90  9.04  37.20  39.11  21.49  9.83  19.44  20.22  20.55  10.60  1.43  6.14 
                               
Manufacturing Firms                               
Total Assets (%)  15.78  5.28  19.69  15.28  10.25  4.31  8.62  8.34  6.51  4.33  1.24  3.69 
Sales (%)  21.47  3.67  18.61  10.82  12.87  4.24  4.00  9.41  4.34  7.08  1.24  0.76 
Earnings (before interest and tax) (%)  -122.95  -18.21  -71.86  -74.02 -75.66 -53.45 -73.30 -19.64 -15.54 -29.28 -28.80  -22.08 
Payables  (%)  44.28  5.54  45.72 49.35 38.03 20.32 27.60 11.19 18.08 12.80  3.20  4.35 
Total Debt (%)  35.26  -13.78  112.99  78.56  73.62  32.26  3.47  22.96  13.18  4.76  -4.72  -17.12 
Liabilities (%)  23.65  7.30  36.11  32.08  17.00  8.32  15.09  16.66  15.07  6.17  -0.16  5.92 
                               
Service Firms                               
Total Assets (%)  18.10  5.05  31.69  23.84  18.84  5.91  11.40  15.20  14.03  8.51  1.17  4.13 
Sales (%)  26.34  2.12  35.71  20.18  15.74  3.68  3.75  16.74  12.43  7.56  -1.03  -1.02 
Earnings (before interest and tax) (%)  -121.73  -22.06  -45.15  -114.72 -185.28 -100.04 -218.41  0.12  -15.56  -16.93  -27.23  -24.56 
Payables  (%)  47.84  1.48  77.57 70.36 53.81 21.04 26.94 19.61 23.82 13.13  -0.41  1.67 
Total Debt (%)  40.04  -14.69  162.68  98.82  123.67  37.05  2.98  30.08  11.69  16.73  -4.31  -18.14 
Liabilities (%)  30.43  5.83  42.99  37.38  24.69  6.84  20.82  17.80  18.62  11.02  -1.15  2.59 
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Table 7: Fixed Effects and Pooled OLS Regressions 
 
This table reports Fixed Effects and Pooled regression results. Concentration (sum of the 5 largest firms’ total sales divided by the total sales in the industry) is a measure if industry 




   Fixed Effects  Pooled 
   Debt/Asset STDebt/Asset LTDebt/Asset Payables/Asset Debt/Asset STDebt/Asset LTDebt/Asset Payables/Asset
Ln(Sales)  0.005 0.005  -0.019  0.025  0.018 0.012  0.005  0.02 
   [0.61]  [0.83]  [1.82]*  [4.37]***  [8.40]***  [8.60]***  [1.97]**  [10.27]*** 
Lnage   -0.081  0.001  -0.13  -0.085 -0.032  -0.007  -0.038  -0.037 
   [3.70]***  [0.04]  [4.40]***  [5.18]***  [13.07]***  [4.14]***  [15.20]***  [17.45]*** 
ROA -0.192  -0.144  -0.078  -0.247 -0.142  -0.101  -0.086  -0.38 
    [9.02]***  [7.50]*** [2.08]**  [14.46]*** [10.30]***  [10.02]***  [4.64]*** [26.21]*** 
Fixed Assets/Assets   0.145  -0.007  0.177  -0.201  0.119  -0.046  0.198  -0.41 
    [5.32]*** [0.36]  [4.48]***  [10.25]***  [9.73]*** [6.49]***  [14.00]***  [42.43]*** 
Sales  Growth  0.004  0.001 0.003 0.007  0.01  0.001 0.015 0.006 
   [1.21]  [0.58]  [0.85]  [3.22]***  [4.10]***  [0.43]  [5.17]***  [3.04]*** 
Depreciation/Assets  -0.196  0.018  -0.274 -0.201  0.084  0.109  -0.017 -0.165 
   [1.90]*  [0.21]  [2.06]**  [2.21]**  [1.18]  [2.56]**  [0.21]  [3.03]*** 
Concentration  0.048 0.004  0.081  0.027  0.093 0.034  0.093  0.012 
    [2.06]**  [0.18]  [2.76]*** [1.42]  [3.83]***  [1.87]*  [3.18]*** [0.61] 
Constant 0.268  0.068  0.525  0.347  -0.115  -0.038  -0.052  0.171 
    [3.33]*** [1.07]  [4.66]***  [5.90]***  [2.77]*** [1.17]  [1.04]  [2.79]*** 
Industry  Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 17,767  16,906  10,140  19,324 17,767  16,906  10,140  19,324 
R-squared  0.81 0.78  0.81  0.9  0.13 0.12  0.15  0.44 
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Table 8: Pooled OLS  Regressions 
 
This table incorporates in the Pooled OLS regression three subsets of dummy variables; size (small and medium, being large the 
omitted category), ownership (foreign, government, keeping private domestic firms as the omitted variable), and region (keeping 
“other regions” unspecified). Concentration (sum of the 5 largest firms’ total sales divided by the total sales in the industry) is a 
measure if industry concentration. Robust t statistics are in brackets. Significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels is represented as 
***,  **,  * respectively.  
 
   Pooled 
   Debt/Asset STDebt/Asset LTDebt/Asset Payables/Asset 
Small 0.028  0.047  -0.034  0.057 
   [1.29]  [3.01]***  [1.41]  [2.61]*** 
Medium 0.028  0.04  -0.019  0.046 
   [1.60]  [3.14]***  [0.97]  [2.55]** 
Foreign 0.017  -0.002  0.053  -0.048 
   [1.75]*  [0.21]  [4.42]***  [4.96]*** 
Government -0.106  -0.042  -0.081 -0.111 
   [9.29]***  [5.49]***  [6.50]***  [11.40]*** 
Wielkopolskie 0.001  -0.002  -0.005  0.001 
   [0.15]  [0.23] [0.55] [0.13] 
Mazoweicke 0.003  -0.009 0.028  -0.005 
   [0.40]  [1.45]  [2.71]***  [0.62] 
Slaskie -0.034  -0.023  -0.014  0.006 
   [3.39]***  [2.94]***  [1.35]  [0.51] 
Ln Sales  0.018  0.02  -0.006  0.025 
   [3.61]***  [5.38]***  [1.15]  [5.28]*** 
Ln Age  -0.013  -0.003  -0.017  -0.023 
   [3.02]***  [0.89]  [3.66]***  [6.22]*** 
ROA -0.176  -0.13  -0.064  -0.38 
   [7.90]***  [7.38]***  [2.54]**  [15.87]*** 
Fixed Asset/Asset  0.143  -0.032  0.209  -0.359 
   [7.71]***  [2.81]***  [9.49]***  [22.70]*** 
Sales Growth   0.007  0  0.013  0.007 
   [2.13]**  [0.19]  [2.83]***  [2.15]** 
Depreciation/Assets -0.009  0.113  -0.148  -0.203 
   [0.09]  [1.78]*  [1.40]  [2.40]** 
Concentration 0.075  0.019  0.1  0.049 
   [2.21]**  [0.76]  [2.19]**  [1.87]* 
Constant -0.101  -0.123  0.064  0.064 
   [1.37]  [2.19]** [0.76]  [0.83] 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 7,312  6,985  4,034  7,970 
R-squared 0.18  0.16  0.2  0.48   41
Table 9: Pooled OLS Regression by Firm Size 
This table incorporates Pooled OLS regressions with size breakdown. Concentration ( sum of the 5 largest firms’ total sales divided by the total sales in the industry)  is a measure 
if industry concentration. Robust t statistics are in brackets. Significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels is represented as ***,  **,  * respectively. 
Table R3: Financing Ratios by Firm Size 
 
   Pooled 
   Debt/Asset STDebt/Asset  LTDebt/Asset  Payables/Asset 
    Small  Medium Large  Small  Medium Large  Small  Medium Large  Small  Medium  Large 
Foreign  0.027 0.018 -0.066  -0.011  0.005 -0.002  0.077 0.052 -0.091  -0.017  -0.075  -0.146 
    [2.18]**  [1.22] [1.20] [1.26] [0.40] [0.08] [5.20]***  [2.95]***  [1.38]  [1.25]  [5.65]***  [2.92]*** 
Government  -0.101 -0.112 -0.122 -0.047 -0.04  -0.013 -0.071 -0.087 -0.171  -0.104  -0.12  -0.239 
    [8.03]*** [5.51]*** [2.04]**  [5.37]*** [2.78]*** [0.35]  [5.75]*** [4.30]*** [2.42]** [8.67]***  [8.17]***  [3.92]*** 
Wielkopolskie  -0.019  0.024 0.061 -0.017  0.011 0.075 -0.007  0.008 -0.075  0.007  -0.007  0.021 
    [1.69]*  [1.39] [1.73]*  [2.14]**  [0.75] [3.57]***  [0.70] [0.55] [1.67]*  [0.57]  [0.44]  [0.68] 
Mazoweicke  -0.012  0.026 0.017 -0.024  0.007 0.025 0.028 0.037 0.002  0.001  -0.009  0.006 
    [1.23] [1.72]*  [0.47] [3.45]***  [0.68] [1.26] [2.42]**  [2.18]**  [0.04]  [0.09]  [0.66]  [0.21] 
Slaskie  -0.04  -0.026 -0.041 -0.032 -0.012 -0.024 -0.017 -0.019 -0.004  -0.008  0.005  0.117 
    [3.44]***  [1.59] [1.02] [3.49]***  [0.89] [0.94] [1.37] [1.23] [0.10]  [0.59]  [0.32]  [1.64] 
Ln  Sales  0.016 0.024 0.015 0.021 0.023 0  -0.019  0.004 0.007  0.031  0.02  0.011 
    [2.18]**  [2.98]***  [0.71] [4.23]***  [3.65]***  [0.01] [2.03]**  [0.47] [0.38]  [4.16]***  [2.89]***  [0.71] 
Ln  Age  -0.008 -0.013 -0.026 0.002  -0.004 -0.011 -0.013 -0.016 -0.025  -0.018  -0.032  -0.003 
    [1.42] [1.96]*  [1.63] [0.48] [0.86] [1.24] [2.50]**  [2.27]**  [1.33]  [3.65]***  [5.98]***  [0.19] 
ROA  -0.139 -0.193 -0.338 -0.12  -0.13  -0.233 -0.01  -0.107 -0.112  -0.383  -0.373  -0.35 
    [4.95]*** [5.45]*** [2.85]*** [5.54]*** [4.61]*** [2.75]*** [0.31]  [2.45]**  [0.79]  [12.55]*** [10.30]*** [2.51]** 
Fixed Asset/Asset  0.136  0.178  -0.038  -0.023  -0.024 -0.179 0.185  0.237  0.144  -0.321  -0.422  -0.298 
    [6.61]*** [5.42]*** [0.45]  [1.84]*  [1.14]  [3.63]*** [7.63]*** [6.69]*** [1.23]  [16.31]*** [16.79]*** [4.22]*** 
Sales  Growth  0.007 0.011 -0.007  -0.002  0.002 0.003 0.014 0.019 -0.014  0.012  -0.001  0.008 
    [1.52] [1.96]*  [0.67] [0.65] [0.68] [0.35] [2.60]***  [2.53]**  [1.62]  [2.75]***  [0.13]  [0.73] 
Depreciation/Asset -0.028  0.077  0.083 -0.003  0.286 0.335 -0.013  -0.247  -0.295  -0.251  -0.267  0.148 
    [0.26] [0.41] [0.19] [0.04] [2.34]**  [0.92] [0.11] [1.24] [0.80]  [2.45]**  [1.73]* [0.37] 
Concentration  0.041 0.079 0.301 -0.017  0.043 0.102 0.078 0.081 0.332  0.04  0.041  0.234 
    [1.04] [1.14] [1.67]*  [0.63] [0.94] [0.67] [1.30] [0.80] [1.96]*  [1.17]  [0.80]  [2.13]** 
Constant  -0.018 -0.154 0.424  -0.071 -0.139 0.024  0.274  -0.061 0.068  0.015  -0.154  0.491 
    [0.21] [1.39] [1.85]*  [1.38] [1.57] [0.15] [2.81]***  [0.44] [0.36]  [0.16]  [1.39]  [2.87]*** 
Industry  Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  3,982 2,830 500  3,800 2,706 479  2,118 1,591 325 4,419  2,830  524 
R-squared  0.19 0.19 0.24 0.17 0.15 0.28 0.22 0.24 0.26  0.46  0.19  0.42 
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Table 10: Pooled OLS Regression by  Industry Type 
This table incorporates Pooled OLS regression with sector breakdown. Concentration (sum of the 5 largest firms’ total sales divided by the total sales in the industry) is a measure if 
industry concentration. Robust t statistics are in brackets. Significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels is represented as ***,  **,  * respectively. 
 
   Pooled 


















Small  0.099  -0.01 -0.035  0.07  0.039 0.003 0.039 -0.096  -0.051  0.067 0.07  -0.006 
    [3.28]*** [0.29] [0.66] [3.17]***  [1.57] [0.08] [1.36] [2.13]**  [0.96]  [2.40]**  [2.01]**  [0.21] 
Medium  0.076  0.002 0  0.057 0.034 0  0.025 -0.065  0  0.038 0.061 0 
    [3.28]*** [0.06] [.]  [3.36]***  [1.60] [.]  [1.20] [1.63] [.]  [1.72]*  [2.01]**  [.] 
Foreign  0.026  -0.003 0.371  0  -0.011 0.134  0.061  0.037  0.295  -0.046 -0.052 -0.141 
    [1.77]*  [0.25] [2.69]***  [0.02] [1.12] [1.35] [4.23]***  [2.15]** 
[2.19]*
*  [3.85]*** [3.61]*** [2.13]** 
Government  -0.103  -0.133 -0.046 -0.052 -0.05  -0.005 -0.061 -0.109 -0.071  -0.077 -0.151 -0.141 
    [6.98]***  [8.44]*** [0.77]  [5.03]*** [4.81]*** [0.16]  [4.75]*** [5.56]*** [1.82]* [6.98]*** [9.51]*** [3.28]*** 
Wielkopolskie  -0.003  0.012 0.012 -0.008  0.008 0.011 -0.005  -0.011  0.003  0.02  -0.016  -0.016 
    [0.22]  [0.86] [0.39] [0.73] [0.68] [0.55] [0.36] [0.94] [0.13]  [1.64] [0.99] [0.82] 
Mazoweicke  -0.005  0.013 -0.078  -0.008  -0.009  -0.025  0.005 0.044 -0.069  0.015 -0.03  0.067 
    [0.31]  [1.20] [1.44] [0.70] [1.19] [0.56] [0.33] [3.22]***  [1.36]  [1.14] [2.51]**  [1.36] 
Slaskie  -0.056  -0.014 0  -0.034 -0.01  0  -0.027 -0.007 0  0.021  -0.021 0 
    [3.95]*** [0.98] [.]  [3.28]***  [0.85] [.]  [1.84]*  [0.45] [.]  [1.35] [1.21] [.] 
Ln  Sales  0.033  0.018 -0.032  0.024 0.025 -0.007  0.007 -0.015  -0.029  0.031 0.029 0.027 
    [4.05]***  [2.81]*** [1.11]  [4.49]*** [5.12]*** [0.32]  [0.91]  [1.80]*  [1.49]  [4.89]*** [4.64]*** [1.86]* 
Ln  Age  0  -0.039 0.008  0.004  -0.018 0.015  -0.009 -0.036 -0.008  -0.026 -0.03  -0.008 
    [0.06]  [6.50]*** [0.57]  [0.89]  [4.23]*** [1.55]  [1.42]  [5.06]*** [0.57]  [5.09]*** [5.05]*** [0.95] 
ROA  -0.209  -0.133 -0.467 -0.161 -0.099 -0.278 -0.067 -0.027 -0.202  -0.284 -0.452 -0.507 
    [6.27]***  [4.44]*** [2.74]*** [6.15]*** [4.03]*** [2.50]**  [1.95]*  [0.76]  [0.97]  [9.00]*** 
[13.48]**
*  [3.73]*** 
Fixed Asset/Asset  0.055  0.178  -0.059  -0.079  -0.01 -0.135  0.128 0.242 0.125  -0.295  -0.416  -0.161 




*  [2.12]** 
Sales  Growth  0.014  0.001 0.065 0.002 -0.002  0.016 0.014 0.01  0.036  0.015 -0.002  0.064 
    [2.59]*** [0.12] [1.97]*  [0.48] [0.64] [0.62] [2.61]***  [1.51] [0.96]  [4.21]***  [0.35] [2.94]*** 
Depreciation/Asset 0.12  -0.018  -0.239  0.055 0.148 -0.611  0.172 -0.25  0.218  -0.161  -0.176  0.675 
    [0.76]  [0.17] [0.22] [0.47] [2.10]**  [0.93] [1.00] [2.06]**  [0.26]  [1.36] [1.65]*  [0.80] 
Concentration  -0.211  -0.089 0  -0.151 -0.15  0  -0.045 0.078  0  0.116  -0.069 0 
    [3.99]***  [2.31]**  [.]  [3.81]*** [6.38]*** [.]  [0.94]  [1.55]  [.]  [3.11]*** [1.98]**  [.] 
Constant  -0.12  0.095  0.445  -0.055 -0.055 0.195  -0.015 0.318  0.332  0.094  0.358  0.092 
    [1.24]  [1.14] [1.59] [0.82] [0.87] [0.97] [0.16] [2.92]***  [1.69]*  [1.18] [4.32]***  [0.65] 
Industry  Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies  No  No No No No No No No No  No No No 
Observations  3,270  3,843 188  3,120 3,675 180  1,991 1,887 149  3,473 4,295 188 
R-squared  0.17  0.18 0.34 0.14 0.16 0.25 0.16 0.24 0.37  0.31 0.47 0.55 
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Table 11:  Pooled OLS Regression. Financing, Corporate Governance 
 
This table incorporates Pooled OLS regression with two alternative subsets of dummy variables: the first  identifies firms 
with majority holding (greater than 50%)- owned by either a foreign or a private domestic investor- and the second 
identifies majorities held by the state, an individual or an industrial shareholder.  Robust t statistics in brackets. 
Significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels is represented as ***,  **,  * respectively.  
 
   Pooled 
   Debt/Asset STDebt/Asset  LTDebt/Asset  Payables/Asset 
    (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1)  (2) 
Small  0.018 0.013 0.046 0.043 -0.031  -0.036  0.041  0.041 
    [0.74] [0.52] [2.59]***  [2.48]**  [1.15] [1.35] [1.56]  [1.56] 
Medium  0.023 0.019 0.041 0.039 -0.014  -0.019  0.029  0.031 
    [1.17] [0.97] [2.82]***  [2.76]***  [0.66] [0.91] [1.37]  [1.48] 
Foreign  -0.139  0.024 -0.122  0.009 0.026 0.055 -0.134  -0.035 
    [2.05]**  [1.10] [2.04]**  [0.68] [0.51] [1.74]*  [1.85]* [1.92]* 
Government  -0.116 -0.161 -0.045 -0.051 -0.085 -0.122 -0.142  -0.029 
    [7.21]*** [3.48]*** [4.38]*** [1.53]  [4.58]*** [2.31]**  [10.13]*** [0.82] 
Wielkopolskie  0.01  0.011 -0.002  -0.001  0.011 0.012 0  -0.002 
    [0.78] [0.87] [0.17] [0.08] [0.92] [0.95] [0.04]  [0.17] 
Mazoweicke  0.003 0.005 -0.01 -0.008  0.032 0.032 0.004  0.006 
    [0.29] [0.48] [1.20] [0.98] [2.46]**  [2.48]**  [0.38]  [0.52] 
Slaskie  -0.035 -0.035 -0.02  -0.02  -0.021 -0.02  -0.002  -0.003 
    [2.79]***  [2.78]***  [1.97]**  [1.99]**  [1.57] [1.48] [0.13]  [0.23] 
Ln  Sales  0.017 0.017 0.018 0.019 -0.003  -0.004  0.024  0.025 
    [2.81]*** [2.84]*** [4.34]*** [4.38]*** [0.47]  [0.53]  [4.19]***  [4.27]*** 
Ln  Age  -0.007 -0.01  0  -0.001 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017  -0.017 
    [1.50] [1.87]*  [0.09] [0.34] [2.58]**  [2.67]***  [3.67]***  [3.82]*** 
ROA  -0.184 -0.187 -0.118 -0.121 -0.096 -0.093 -0.35  -0.354 
    [6.26]*** [6.42]*** [5.35]*** [5.50]*** [2.62]*** [2.60]*** [10.72]*** [10.88]*** 
Fixed Asset/Asset  0.11  0.11  -0.034  -0.035  0.166 0.169 -0.343  -0.347 
    [4.76]*** [4.70]*** [2.23]**  [2.32]**  [6.12]*** [6.17]*** [17.01]*** [17.14]*** 
Sales  Growth  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
    [1.29]  [1.29]  [3.41]***  [2.98]***  [2.50]** [2.51]** [0.22]  [0.14] 
Depreciation/Asset 0.087  0.088  0.19  0.193  -0.137 -0.144 -0.138  -0.127 
    [0.67] [0.67] [2.25]**  [2.29]**  [0.98] [1.04] [1.27]  [1.17] 
Concentration  0.058 0.058 -0.002  -0.002  0.098 0.099 0.073  0.071 
    [1.49] [1.47] [0.06] [0.09] [1.82]*  [1.84]*  [2.54]**  [2.49]** 
majorityforeign  -0.032     0.017    -0.058     0.068    
   [0.55]     [0.42]    [0.83]     [1.72]*    
majoritydomestic  -0.192     -0.108    -0.093     -0.008    
   [2.22]**     [1.62]    [1.28]     [0.12]    
majoritystate     0.08    0.048     0.042     -0.08 
      [2.63]***    [1.89]*     [1.45]     [3.50]*** 
majorityindividual     0.029    0.038     0.001     0.032 
      [0.85]    [1.76]*     [0.03]     [1.10] 
majorityindustrial     0.026    0.032     0.019     -0.007 
      [0.80]    [1.54]     [0.46]     [0.26] 
Constant  0.119  -0.099  0.011  -0.133  0.11 0.02 0.076 0.036 
    [1.01] [1.12] [0.12] [1.97]**  [0.94] [0.19] [0.71]  [0.41] 
Industry  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations  4,754 4,754 4,515 4,515 2,584 2,584 5,264  5,264 
R-squared  0.22 0.21 0.2  0.19 0.22 0.22 0.5  0.5 
 
 